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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SAME-SEX “MARRIAGE” UNDER STATE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENTS

PAUL BENJAMIN LINTON*

I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, homosexuals have turned to state courts in an effort to force
states to recognize same-sex marriages, or the legal equivalent. Not
surprisingly, cases have been brought in several states whose constitutions
provide that equality of rights shall not be denied on account of sex or which
otherwise prohibit discrimination based on sex. This Article explores whether
same-sex marriages must be recognized in nineteen states that have adopted
equal rights or anti-discrimination provisions. Focusing on these nineteen
states is appropriate for two reasons: First, equal rights provisions are the only
state constitutional provisions that expressly prohibit discrimination on account
of sex, which goes to the heart of the same-sex marriage issue. Second, courts
in these states typically apply a more rigorous standard of review to sex-based
discrimination than do courts in states without such provisions. If recognition
of same-sex marriages is not required by an equal rights provision, then it is
unlikely that it would be required by an equal protection guarantee, or a
privileges and immunities guarantee. Where it is helpful, this Article also
considers equal protection and privileges and immunities jurisprudence in the
states that are discussed.
II. A NINETEEN STATE SURVEY
1.

Alaska

Article I, section 3, of the Alaska Constitution provides: “No person is to
be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of race, color,
creed, sex, or national origin.”1 On November 3, 1998, the citizens of Alaska
approved the adoption of article I, section 25. This provision foreclosed the
possibility that article I, section 3, would be interpreted by the Alaska Supreme
* Mr. Linton is an attorney in private practice in Illinois who specializes in state and federal
constitutional law. He has published numerous law review articles on a wide variety of subjects,
including the adoption and interpretation of state equal rights amendments.
1. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3.
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Court to require recognition of same-sex marriage. Article I, section 25, of the
Alaska Constitution provides: “To be valid or recognized in this State, a
marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.”2 Under this
amendment to the Alaska Declaration of Rights, no provision of the Alaska
Constitution may be interpreted to require state-sanctioned, same-sex
marriages.3
2.

Colorado

Article II, section 29, of the Colorado Constitution provides: “Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State of Colorado or
any of its political subdivisions on account of sex.”4
It is not entirely clear whether sex-based classifications are subject to strict
judicial scrutiny under the state equal rights amendment or only to the
intermediate scrutiny already mandated by the federal Equal Protection
Clause.5 The Colorado Court of Appeals held that, under article II, section 29,
“a differentiation based on gender must serve an important government
objective and be substantially related to that objective.”6 While some
decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court provide support for this proposition,7
other state supreme court decisions suggest that a higher standard of review
applies. For example, in R. McG. v. J.W.,8 the Colorado Supreme Court held
that a statute that fell short “of satisfying the intermediate level of judicial
scrutiny applicable to gender-based classification under [federal] equal
2. Id. § 25.
3. In Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, an Alaska Superior Court judge held that, under
the right of privacy provision guarantee of the Alaska Constitution (Article I, § 22), “the personal
choice of a life partner is fundamental and that such a choice may include persons of the same
sex.” No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). Because
Alaska’s marriage statute banning same-sex marriage interfered with the exercise of this right, see
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011(a) (Michie 2000), the court concluded that the statute was subject to
strict judicial scrutiny and could be upheld only if it was necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest. Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *5-6. In dicta, the court also opined that the
challenged statute classified on the basis of sex, in violation of the state equal rights amendment,
article I, section 3. Id. Holding that the statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage was subject to
strict scrutiny, the court ordered that further hearings be scheduled “to determine whether a
compelling state interest can be shown for the ban on same-sex marriage found in the Alaska
Marriage Code.” Id. at *6. Following the ratification of article I, section 25, the superior court
dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenge. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88748
(Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 1999).
4. COLO. CONST, art. II, § 29.
5. Under the latter standard, a classification based upon sex must be “substantially related
to the achievement” of an important governmental objective. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976).
6. In re Estate of Musso, 932 P.2d 853, 855 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
7. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1015 (Colo. 1982) (en banc).
8. R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980) (en banc).
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protection doctrine” necessarily also failed “to satisfy the stricter judicial
scrutiny standard applicable to the equal rights amendment of the Colorado
Constitution.”9 Furthermore, in People v. Green,10 the Colorado Supreme
Court, citing article II, section 29, stated that “legislative classifications based
solely on sexual status must receive the closest judicial scrutiny.”11 Decisions
in Colorado seem to support arguments that advocate either strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny.
Regardless of the applicable standard of review, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that although the state’s equal rights amendment “prohibits unequal
treatment based exclusively on the circumstance of sex, social stereotypes
connected with gender, and culturally induced dissimilarities,” it “does not
prohibit differential treatment among the sexes when . . . that treatment is
reasonably and genuinely based on physical characteristics unique to just one
sex.”12 “In such a case,” the court continued, “the sexes are not similarly
situated and thus, equal treatment is not required.”13 In Salinas, the court
upheld a statutory rape statute that applied only to males.14 This exception
may provide a basis for prohibiting same-sex marriages, even if the prohibition
is based on sex.15
In Ross v. Denver Department of Health & Hospitals,16 a female social
worker challenged a municipal sick-leave policy that allowed an employee to
take time off of work to care for an ill spouse and certain other close relatives.
This policy made no provision for the employee’s “domestic partner.”17 The
plaintiff argued that, unlike an unmarried heterosexual employee, as a
homosexual employee, she could not marry her same-sex partner18 and thus
qualify for sick leave to take care of her.19 The court of appeals rejected this
argument, stating:
That distinction, however, does not alter our conclusion that the Career Service
Rules do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. In this regard,
[plaintiff’s] concern is with a perceived unfairness of the state’s marital laws.
9. Id. at 671-72 (emphasis added).
10. People v. Green, 514 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1973) (en banc).
11. Id. at 770; see also Civil Rights Comm’n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358, 1363
(Colo. 1998) (en banc) (dictum). Citing both Lujan and Musso, the federal district court has
noted the lack of an authoritative state-court determination of the applicable standard of review
under section 29. See Concrete Workers of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 86 F. Supp.
2d 1042, 1063 (D. Colo. 2000).
12. People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703, 706 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).
13. Id.
14. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-401(1) (1963).
15. See discussion infra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
16. Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
17. Id. at 518.
18. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104(1)(b) (West 2001).
19. Ross, 883 P.2d at 520.
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The decision to change the marriage laws to permit same-sex marriages,
however, is a matter for the legislature, not the courts.20

The court added that: “[T]he definition of ‘family’ is a policy question
entrusted to the political branches of government, and we have no judicial
authority to substitute our political judgments for those of the other
branches.”21 The Colorado state court deferred judgment to the legislature to
define marriage.
The Colorado Constitution does not contain an explicit equal protection
guarantee. Nevertheless, the due process guarantee of the state constitution22
has been interpreted to include an equal protection component. In Lujan v.
Colorado State Board of Education,23 the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that no
state shall deny a person equal protection of the law. Although the Colorado
Constitution does not contain an identical provision, it is well-established that
a like guarantee exists within the constitution’s due process clause [citing
article II, section 25] and that its substantive application is the same insofar as
equal protection analysis is concerned.24

Occasionally, state court opinions note that the equal protection component
of the state due process guarantee may be given a broader reading than the
federal Equal Protection Clause.25 It does not appear, however, that any statute
or ordinance that would pass federal equal protection review has ever failed
state equal protection review. More commonly, Colorado courts have said that
the equal protection component of article II, section 25, is similar to the Equal
Protection Clause,26 and that the analytical model developed by the United
States Supreme Court in construing the Equal Protection Clause is to be
followed in interpreting section 25.27 Following this reasoning, if the Equal
Protection Clause does not require state-sanctioned same-sex marriages,
neither would the equal protection component of the due process guarantee of
the Colorado Constitution.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25.
23. Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (en banc).
24. Id. at 1014; see also Kinsey v. Preeson, 746 P.2d 542, 546 (Colo. 1987) (en banc)
(following Lujan).
25. See, e.g., Millis v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 626 P.2d 652, 657 (Colo. 1981); May v.
Town of Mountain Valley, 969 P.2d 790, 792 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Millis, 626 P.2d at
657).
26. See, e.g., Nat’l Prohibition Party v. State, 752 P.2d 80, 83 n.4 (Colo. 1998) (en banc);
Colo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 697 P.2d 1, 13 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
27. See, e.g., Firelock, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Colo. 1989) (en banc);
Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 674 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
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The Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions in Evans v. Romer,28 struck
down a citizen-sponsored, state constitutional initiative barring state and local
government from conferring “protected status” on the basis of homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation.29 Nothing in Evans, however, even remotely
suggests that the court would treat homosexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class. Romer, of course, was decided on federal, not state, constitutional
grounds. Significantly, however, the plaintiffs did not appeal the trial court’s
rejection of their argument that “gay men, lesbians and bisexuals should be
found to be either a ‘suspect class’ or a ‘quasi-suspect’ class.”30 Given the
purpose and interpretation of the Colorado equal rights amendment, it is
unlikely that a state court would mandate recognition of same-sex marriages.
3.

Connecticut

Article I, section 20, of the Connecticut Constitution provides: “No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subject to segregation or
discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights
because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or
mental disability.”31
In evaluating sex-based classifications, Connecticut courts have not
developed a uniform standard of review. In Dydyn v. Department of Liquor
Control,32 the Connecticut Appellate Court rejected an equal rights challenge
to a state liquor control commission regulation prohibiting nude and semi-nude
female dancing in establishments licensed to serve liquor. Dydyn held that the
regulation discriminated on account of sex, in that it prohibited exposure of
female, but not male, breasts. The court held, however, that the regulation was
constitutional because it was “substantially related to an important
governmental interest,” which included avoiding public disturbances
associated with establishments featuring female topless dancers.33 The court
applied an intermediate scrutiny review, rather than strict scrutiny. In Daly v.
DelPonte,34 however, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that classifications
based on physical or mental disability, two other categories specified in article
I, section 20, are constitutionally suspect and subject to a strict scrutiny

28. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (affirming preliminary
injunction), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (en
banc) (affirming permanent injunction), aff’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
29. See Evans, 854 P.2d 1270; Evans, 882 P.2d 1335; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, held
unconstitutional by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
30. Evans, 882 P.2d at 1341 n.3.
31. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20. The word, “sex,” was added in 1974. See id.
32. Dydyn v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 531 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
33. Id. at 175.
34. Daly v. DelPonte, 624 A.2d 876 (Conn. 1993).
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standard of review.35 DelPonte suggests that the supreme court would also
view sex-based classifications as suspect. In a case decided more than twentyfive years ago, the Connecticut Supreme Court referred to “the strict scrutiny
test mandated by the equal rights amendment” for sex-based classifications,36
but did not decide the case on the basis of that test.37 Given the holding in
DelPonte and the dictum in Page, it is probable that the Connecticut Supreme
Court would treat a classification based upon sex as suspect and apply strict
scrutiny analysis.
Despite the paucity of authority interpreting the Connecticut equal rights
amendment, there are several reasons why the amendment should not mandate
same-sex marriages, in violation of its public policy.38 First, like other state
equal rights amendments adopted at the same time, the amendment to article I,
section 20, was intended to ensure that women have equal rights with men.39
Because neither men nor women may marry members of the same sex, there is
no inequality between men and women in prohibiting same-sex marriages.
Second, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a law that applies equally
to men and women does not violate the equal rights amendment.40 Third,
Connecticut appears to recognize the “unique physical characteristics”
exception to the scope of the state equal rights amendment, which may also
justify treating men and women differently for purposes of marriage.41 In
Dydyn,42 the Connecticut Appellate Court held that the state liquor control
commission did not violate the state equal rights amendment in promulgating a
regulation that prohibited female, but not male, employees of establishments
35. Id. at 882-84.
36. Page v. Welfare Comm’r, 365 A.2d 1118, 1124 (Conn. 1976).
37. In Page, the supreme court held that welfare department regulations that allowed a
legally liable son with a working spouse, but not a legally liable daughter with a working spouse,
to take exemptions for minor children when computing monthly contributions for the support of
an indigent parent were unconstitutional even under a rational-basis standard of review. See id. at
1125.
38. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(a)(4) (West Supp. 2001).
39. See Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 357 A.2d 498, 503 (Conn. 1975)
(dictum) (stating that “[t]he people of this state and their legislators have unambiguously
indicated an intent to abolish sex discrimination”); Barbara Lifton, The Amendment to the State
Constitution Prohibiting Discrimination on Account of Sex, 49 CONN. B.J. 463, 468 (1975)
(stating that “[b]ecause of the successful ratification of the amendment to Section 20 prohibiting
discrimination on account of sex, women and men in Connecticut now theoretically share equal
legal status”); Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz, Connecticut: ERA, 51 CONN. B.J. 113, 119 (1977)
(providing that the principal objective sought by state equal rights amendment was to “provide
equality of rights to Connecticut women”).
40. See State v. Kelley, 643 A.2d 854, 858 (Conn. 1994) (stating that doctrine allowing
constancy of accusation evidence to be used in prosecutions for sex offenses applies “equally to
male and female victims” and thus is not “gender biased”).
41. See discussion infra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
42. Dydyn v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 531 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
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selling liquor from exposing their breasts. The court noted that “there can be
no doubt that in our society female breasts, unlike the male breasts, constitute
an erogenous zone and are commonly associated with sexual arousal.”43 The
court also quoted with approval the opinion in Tolbert v. City of Memphis,44
that “[i]n our culture, for the purpose of this type of ordinance, female breasts
are a justifiable basis for a gender-based classification.”45 It is doubtful,
therefore, that the equal rights amendment mandates same-sex marriages.
Apart from the specific categories enumerated in article I, section 20—
religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex, physical or mental
disability—the equal protection guarantee of section 20 has the same meaning
and the same limitations as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.46 Accordingly, if the Equal Protection Clause is interpreted not
to mandate state recognition of same-sex marriages, article I, section 20, would
not be so interpreted.
The Connecticut Appellate Court rejected disparate impact as a basis for
invalidating a statute under the equal rights amendment. In Wendt v. Wendt,47
the court held that proof of a discriminatory impact alone would not provide a
basis for the wife’s equal rights claim. The court found that not allowing for
an equal division of marital property in the state property distribution statute
did not violate the state equal rights amendment.48 The prohibition of samesex marriages, however, would not appear to have a disparate impact on either
men or women.
4.

Florida

Effective November 3, 1998, the “Basic Rights” provision of the Florida
Constitution was amended to read as follows:
All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have
inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and
liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire,
possess and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance,
disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship

43. Id. at 175.
44. Tolbert v. City of Memphis, 568 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
45. Id. at 1290; Dydyn, 531 A.2d at 175 (quoting Tolbert).
46. See Broadley v. Bd. of Educ., 639 A.2d 502, 506 n.15 (Conn. 1994) (citing Keogh v.
Bridgeport, 444 A.2d 225 (Conn. 1982); Franklin v. Berger, 560 A.2d 444, 447 (Conn. 1989)).
See also Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 440 A.2d 792, 797 n.5 (Conn. 1981); State
v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 670 n.35 (Conn. 1998) (noting that the defendants “concede that the
equal protection provisions of the Connecticut constitution [art. 1, §§ 1, 20] have the same scope
as the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution”).
47. Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A.2d 1225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
48. Id. at 1243-45.
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may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of any
right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability.49

In adding the phrase, “female and male alike,” in the first sentence after the
words, “[a]ll natural persons,” the Constitution Revision Commission intended
“to secure equality for women in the Constitution.”50 As initially filed, the
proposal would have added the term “sex” to the listing of protected classes.
Concerns were raised that this language could lead Florida courts to require the
recognition of same-sex marriages, as it had in Hawaii. Thus, the Commission
revised the proposal to refer to “female and male alike” and inserted the
following statement of intent in Journal of the Constitution Revision
Commission:
The intent of . . . [this proposal], as adopted, was to affirm explicitly that all
natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law. The proposal
as adopted is not intended, and should not be construed, to confer any right to
same-sex marriages in this state. Many in the body were concerned that the
proposal as it was originally proposed, if adopted by the people, would have
opened the door to same-sex marriages in Florida. That was not an acceptable
result to many members of the Commission. Consequently, the purpose of
amending the original proposal and adopting it in its amended form was to
assure that the proposal would not be deemed in any way to countenance
same-sex marriages.51

In light of this official commentary, it cannot reasonably be argued that the
1998 amendment to article I, section 2, of the Florida Constitution mandates
recognition of same-sex marriages, in violation of the public policy of the
State.52 Thus, the Constitution Revision Commission officially precluded a
court from holding that there is a basic right to a same-sex marriage.

49. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. Prior to the amendment, sex was treated as a “quasi-suspect”
class under article I, section 2. See Purvis v. State, 377 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla. 1979).
50. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 commentary (West Supp. 2001). See also Beal Bank, SSB v.
Almond & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 52 n.7 (Fla. 2001) (“Florida’s Constitution now expressly
protects the equality of women by providing that ‘all natural persons, female and male alike, are
equal before the law.’”) (quoting article I, section 2).
51. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 commentary (West Supp. 2001).
52. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 2002). Given the history of the
amendment, one Florida court has concluded sex is not a suspect classification under article I,
section 2. See Frandsen v. County of Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 758-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(rejecting challenge to state statutes and local ordinance “to the extent that they prohibit exposure
of the female breast in circumstances where the exposure of the male breast would not be
prohibited”). In light of the court’s reasoning in Frandsen, it is debatable whether the addition of
the language, “female and male alike,” should be characterized as the equivalent of an equal
rights amendment.
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Hawaii

The Hawaii Constitution contains two equal rights provisions. Article I,
section 3, provides: “Equality of rights shall not be denied or abridged by the
State on account of sex. The legislature shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this section.”53
And article I, section 5, of the Hawaii Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the
enjoyment of the person’s civil rights or be discriminated against in the
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.54

The courts in Hawaii were well on their way to requiring the State to
recognize same-sex marriages.55
An amendment made to the state
constitution, however, expressly authorizes the legislature to limit marriage to
members of the opposite sex. On November 3, 1998, the citizens of Hawaii
approved what is now section 23 of the Hawaii Declaration of Rights. Section
23 provides, “The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples.”56 Following the adoption of section 23, the Hawaii
Supreme Court, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the circuit court’s
judgment declaring the Hawaii marriage statute unconstitutional.57 As such,
Hawaii does not recognize a constitutional right to same-sex marriages.
6.

Illinois

Article I, section 18, of the Illinois Constitution provides: “The equal
protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the
State or its units of local government and school districts.”58
The Illinois equal rights provision was first proposed in the 1970 Illinois
Constitutional Convention as an amendment to the report of the Bill of Rights

53. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3.
54. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5.
55. In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration and clarification granted
in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), a sharply divided Hawaii Supreme Court held that a Hawaii
statute restricting marriage to members of the opposite sex, see HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1
(Michie 1999), was subject to strict judicial scrutiny under article I, section 5, because, in the
view of a plurality of the court, it discriminated on account of sex. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
The supreme court remanded the case to the circuit court for a trial on the issue as to whether the
statute was narrowly drawn to promote compelling state interests. Id. at 68. On remand,
following a trial, the circuit court declared the statute unconstitutional. Baehr v. Miike, No. 911394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The next day, the court stayed its
ruling pending appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394-05 (Haw.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 1996).
56. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
57. See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (unpublished order entered Dec. 9, 1999).
58. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18.
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Committee.59 Debate over the amendment focused on the discrimination faced
by women in the areas of employment, education and business and for which
standard equal protection analysis offered no adequate remedy.60 There was
no discussion, however, of recognizing same-sex marriages or, for that matter,
discrimination against homosexuals.
In a case of first impression, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded on the
basis of the debates that “the purpose of the amendment was to guarantee
rights for females equal to those of males.”61 In light of the explicit language
of section 18 and the debates, the supreme court found “inescapable the
conclusion that [section 18] was intended to supplement and expand the
guaranties of the equal protection provision of the [Illinois] Bill of Rights and
requires us to hold that a classification based on sex is a ‘suspect classification’
which, to be held valid, must withstand ‘strict judicial scrutiny.’”62
Given the purpose of the Illinois equal rights provision, “to guarantee
rights for females equal to those of males,”63 it is highly implausible that an
Illinois state court would interpret article I, section 18, to mandate recognition
of same-sex marriages. After all, neither men nor women may marry a
member of the same sex. Thus, the Illinois law recognizing marriage as a legal
relationship between one man and one woman64 cannot be said to discriminate
against either sex.65 If the equal rights provision had been intended to require
state-sanctioned, same-sex marriage, surely there would have been some
discussion of such a far-reaching consequence of the provision when it was
being considered. Yet, Odas Nicholson, one of the principal sponsors of the
amendment told the convention, “I don’t see any significant change that will
disturb one’s way of life brought about by this amendment.”66

59. See V RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3669
(1972) [hereinafter RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS]. The original proposed language stated: “Equality
under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State of Illinois or any of
its agents or subdivisions.” Id. Over the objections of the principal sponsors, the introductory
language was amended to read, “The equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 3674. After undergoing
further editorial changes by the Style and Drafting Committee, article I, section 18, emerged in its
present form.
60. Id. at 3669-3677.
61. People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ill. 1974).
62. Id. at 101.
63. Id. at 100.
64. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) (West 2000).
65. In In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), the Illinois Appellate Court
declined to decide whether the statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or the equal rights provision of the Illinois
Constitution where a declaration of invalidity would not have entitled the plaintiff to the relief she
sought, for example, a surviving spouse’s share of the estate of her female “life-partner.”
66. V RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 59, at 3672.
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The Official Text with explanations stated: “This new section states that no
government in Illinois may deny equal protection of the law to anyone because
of his or her sex.”67 Consistent with that understanding, state and federal
courts have held that laws that affect men and women equally do not offend
the Illinois equal rights provision. For example, in Steffa v. Stanley,68 the
Illinois Appellate Court rejected an equal rights challenge to the interspousal
tort immunity statute,69 stating: “As to section 18, the bar against tort actions
between spouses during coverture applies equally to male and female and
cannot therefore be said to discriminate by denying or abridging plaintiff’s
rights on the basis of sex.”70 And in O’Connor v. Board of Education,71 the
Seventh Circuit dissolved a preliminary injunction directing a school board to
permit a junior high school girl to try out for the boys’ sixth grade basketball
team. In its opinion, the court commented that it was “highly unlikely” that the
plaintiff could demonstrate that the school board’s policy of separate but equal
sports programs for boys and girls violated the equal rights provision of the
Illinois Constitution.72
The Illinois reviewing courts have recognized that sex discrimination may
be justified by physiological differences between the sexes. In People v.
Boyer,73 the Illinois Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of former
statutes dealing with incest and aggravated incest. A woman who had sexual
intercourse or performed an act of deviate sexual conduct with a person whom
she knew to be her natural son was guilty of simple incest, a Class 3 felony,
punishable by a sentence of not less than one nor more than ten years in the
penitentiary;74 a man who engaged in the same conduct with a person he knew
to be his natural daughter, or stepdaughter or adopted daughter if she was
under the age of 18, was guilty of aggravated incest, a Class 2 felony,

67. VII id. at 2688.
68. Steffa v. Stanley, 350 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
69. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1001 (1985). Interspousal tort immunity was abolished by Public
Act 85-625, eff. Jan. 1, 1988. See id.; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 65/1 (1999).
70. Steffa, 350 N.E.2d at 889. See Vogel v. Robison, 399 N.E.2d 688 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(following Steffa). But see Wheeler v. City of Rockford, 387 N.E.2d 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). In
Wheeler, the appellate court held unconstitutional a municipal ordinance that prohibited
employees of commercial massage parlors from giving massages to members of the opposite sex.
The ordinance, which allowed masseurs to give massages only to men, and masseuses to give
massages only to women, was held to violate article I, section 18. Id. at 359.
71. O’Conner v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 582.
73. People v. Boyer, 349 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 1976).
74. 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 11-11 (1975); 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1005-8-1(b)(4), (c)(4)
(1975).
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punishable by a term of not less than one nor more than twenty years in
prison.75
In Boyer, the supreme court reversed an appellate court decision declaring
invalid the statutory distinction between aggravated incest and simple incest.76
Without deciding whether the legislative classification of incest was based on
sex, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, the court held that “the State has
demonstrated an interest which justifies, under either standard, the
classification at issue.”77
[A] female victim of a father-daughter incestuous relationship is exposed to
potential harm to which male victims of incestuous relationships are not
exposed. . . . The possibility that the female victim may become pregnant . . .
adds considerably to the potential harm that may result from a father-daughter
incestuous relationship. A female who is impregnated by her father is
confronted with a traumatic experience beyond the experience of the
incestuous act itself. The female must either endure the pregnancy and give
birth to a baby or make the decision to have an abortion. If a child is born as a
result of the incest, the female victim must either care for the child herself or
give the baby up for adoption. The physical change in a female who becomes
pregnant could in itself be a source of trauma to the female. The potential
psychological damage to the victim of a father-daughter incestuous
relationship is admittedly difficult to estimate, but it is surely existent and
considerable. Additionally, a pregnant woman is exposed to some physical
dangers.78

The supreme court agreed with the State that “the physical and
psychological dangers of incest are greater when the offense is committed by a
male and the victim is his daughter,” and held that “the State’s interest in
protecting potential victims of incestuous relationships justifies the statutory
classification at issue.”79
In People v. Medrano,80 the appellate court upheld the legislature’s power
to define rape as a crime which may be directly committed only by a male.81
Rejecting the defendant’s argument that the classification violated article I,
section 18, the court found that “the statute . . . is both rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective . . . and that there is a compelling reason, for
75. 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 11-10 (1975); 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1005-8-1(b)(3), (c)(3)
(1975).
76. Boyer, 349 N.E.2d at 52.
77. Id. at 51.
78. Id. at 51-52.
79. Id. at 52. See also People v. Yocum, 361 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. 1977) (following Boyer);
People v. York, 329 N.E.2d 845, 846-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (noting that the vast majority of
incest cases have involved a father’s abuse of a daughter); People v. Williams, 336 N.E.2d 26, 2830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
80. People v. Medrano, 321 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
81. 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 11-1 (1973).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

SAME-SEX “MARRIAGE”

921

example, the physical differences between men and women, which . . . makes
essential the crime of rape as being an offense which may only be committed
directly by a male.”82 The Illinois courts’ recognition of unique physical
characteristics as an exception to the scope of the equal rights provision may
support the prohibition of same-sex marriage, even assuming that that
prohibition is viewed as one based on sex.83
In People v. Adams,84 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a statute
mandating HIV testing for persons convicted of prostitution did not violate the
equal rights provision merely because of its disparate impact upon female
offenders where the statute itself is gender-neutral on its face and there was no
evidence of an intent by the legislature to discriminate against female
offenders.85 Similarly, the prohibition of same-sex marriages is gender neutral
and does not have even a disparate impact on either men or women.
Article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution provides: “No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be
denied the equal protection of the laws.”86 The Illinois Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the same analysis applies to equal protection claims
brought under article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution, and to equal
protection claims brought under the United States Constitution.87 Given this
equivalency of interpretation, if the Equal Protection Clause is not interpreted
to require recognition of same-sex marriages, then, presumably, neither will
the equal protection guarantee of article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution.
7.

Iowa

Article I, section 1, of the Iowa Constitution provides: “All men and
women are by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights—
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness.”88
The words, “and women,” were added by an amendment to the constitution
adopted on November 3, 1998.89 No Iowa cases to date have interpreted this
new language. As a result, it is unclear whether the additional language is

82. Medrano, 321 N.E.2d at 98.
83. See discussion infra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
84. People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1992).
85. Id. at 585.
86. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
87. See In re Detention of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228, 234-35 (Ill. 2000); People v. Fisher,
705 N.E.2d 67, 72 (Ill. 1998); Jacobson v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 664 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ill. 1996);
Nevitt v. Langfelder, 623 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ill. 1993).
88. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 1.
89. See 1997 Iowa Acts 216; 1995 Iowa Acts 222.
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merely stylistic or was intended to effect a change in the manner in which sexbased classifications are reviewed under the Iowa Constitution.
Article I, section 6, of the Iowa Constitution provides: “All laws of a
general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not
grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges and immunities which, upon
the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”90
The Iowa Supreme Court applies the same analysis in considering a state
privileges and immunities claim as it does in considering a federal equal
protection claim.91 In light of this parallel construction, the privileges and
immunities provision should not be interpreted to require recognition of samesex marriages in violation the public policy of the State of Iowa,92 if the Equal
Protection Clause is not so interpreted.
There is some indication that the Iowa Supreme Court would not consider
evidence of disparate impact alone as sufficient to establish an unconstitutional
denial of the privileges and immunities provision. In Sherman v. Pella
Corporation,93 a woman challenged the classification of carpal tunnel
syndrome as a “scheduled” injury under Iowa’s workers’ compensation statute
on the ground that the classification violated the privileges and immunities
provision. According to the plaintiff, the classification was discriminatory
because “scheduled” injuries generally receive less compensation than
“unscheduled” injuries and carpal tunnel syndrome is more common in women
than in men.94 Noting that the statute was gender neutral on its face, the Iowa
Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that plaintiff had provided no
evidence that other scheduled injuries were more prevalent among women than
among men.95 The court did not reach the issue of disparate impact, but
clearly implied that, absent proof of a legislative intent to discriminate against
women, it would not have invalidated the statute even if disparate impact had
been proven.96 The decision in Sherman suggests that the Iowa Supreme Court
would not regard evidence of disparate impact, standing alone, as sufficient to
sustain a challenge brought to a statute under the amended section 1, either.
90. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6.
91. See In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000); State v. Mann, 602
N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 1999); State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1998); Norland v.
Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 578 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1998); State v. Bell, 572 N.W.2d
910, 911 (Iowa 1997); Kelly v. State, 525 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Iowa 1994); Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist.
v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 792-93 (Iowa 1994); Bruns v. State, 503 N.W.2d 607, 609-11 (Iowa
1993); Klein v. Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 451 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Iowa 1990).
92. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2(1) (West 2001).
93. Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 1998).
94. Id. at 316-18.
95. Id. at 317-18.
96. Id. (following Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that evidence
of disparate impact, without proof of an intent to discriminate, does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

SAME-SEX “MARRIAGE”

923

Iowa’s prohibition of same-sex marriage does not have even a disparate impact
on men or women.
8.

Louisiana

Article I, section 3, of the Louisiana Constitution provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because or race or religious ideas, beliefs, or
affiliations.
No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical
condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude
are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime.97

A law that classifies on the basis of any of the six grounds identified in the
third sentence of section 3—birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations—does not enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality. When such a law is under review, “the burden is on the
proponent of the classification, and the standard of review is heightened,
requiring the proponent to establish that the classification is not arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable because it substantially furthers an appropriate
governmental objective.”98
The addition of the word, “sex,” to the third sentence of article I, section 3,
was clearly intended to eliminate discrimination in the law in favor of men and
against women (as well as legal discrimination in favor of women and against
men).99 A commentary written for the proposed Louisiana Constitution noted
that the supporters of the equal rights language of article I, section 3, argued
that “denial of equal rights for women in the past has been used as the basis for
legal, financial, social and political discrimination.”100 One witness who
testified before the Committee on the Bill of Rights and Elections stated that,
“[w]omen must have rights and privileges of first class citizens . . . for the state
and nation as a whole to achieve the economic and social progress to which all

97. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
98. Manuel v. State, 692 So. 2d 320, 324 (La. 1996). See also Pierce v. LaFourche Parish
Council, 762 So. 2d 608, 611-12 (La. 2000) (following Manuel); Moore v. RLCC Techs., Inc.,
668 So. 2d 1135, 1140-41 (La. 1996).
99. See LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 25
(Greenwood Press 1991) (“[t]he mention of sex [in article I, section 3] was designed to establish
equal rights for women, a subject of intense interest in the Committee on Bill of Rights and
Elections”). The convention’s concern with discrimination against women was reflected in the
floor debate on article I, section 3. See VI RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1973 at 1021-30 (Edward Hardin ed. 1977) (hereinafter “RECORDS”).
100. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY, No. 6, at 203
(1973).
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citizens aspire.”101 Because the Louisiana statutes prohibiting same-sex
marriages102 do not discriminate against women or men—neither may marry a
member of the same sex—those statutes would not appear to violate article I,
section 3.
Louisiana recognizes a unique physical characteristics exception to the
scope of the third sentence of article I, section 3. In a series of cases,
Louisiana courts have rejected state and federal equal protection challenges to
a former provision of the “carnal knowledge of a juvenile” statute,103 which
applied only to males. Under subsection (1) of that statute, carnal knowledge
of a juvenile was committed when, “[A] male over the age of seventeen has
sexual intercourse, with consent, with any unmarried female of the age of
twelve years or more, but under the age of seventeen, when there is an age
difference of greater than two years between the two persons.”104 In State v.
Bell,105 the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to
the statute, expressing the view that “protection of young females from
pregnancy, from possible injury to their reproductive systems as well as the
possibility of lingering mental impairment, is a legitimate area of state concern
justifying the sex classification involved in [the] statute.”106 Although Bell
upheld the statutory provision under a rational basis standard of review, two
later court of appeals decisions, applying an intermediate standard of review,
relied on Bell and sustained the same provision.107
In State v. Fletcher,108 the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected an equal
protection argument that the former rape statute, which defined the offense as
one which could be committed only by a male against a female,109
“unconstitutionally discriminate[d] against a male because it does not similarly
101. Louis Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 LOY. L. REV. 9, 17 n.44 (1975) (quoting
testimony of Elsie J. Allen to Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections on April 6, 1973, in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
102. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 86 (West 1999) (defining marriage as “a legal relationship
between a man and a woman created by civil contract”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West Supp.
2001) (prohibiting same-sex marriage and refusing to recognize such “marriages” contracted in
other jurisdictions). See also In re D.M., 704 So. 2d 786, 791 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (citing LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 86).
103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:80 (West 1986).
104. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:80(A)(1) (West 1986). In 1995, this subsection was amended
to make it gender neutral. See 1995 La. Acts 241, § 1, codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:80(A)(1) (West Supp. 2001).
105. State v. Bell, 377 So. 2d 303 (La. 1979).
106. Id. at 306.
107. See State v. Vining, 609 So. 2d 984 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (applying intermediate
scrutiny); State v. Miller, 663 So. 2d 107, 109 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
108. State v. Fletcher, 341 So. 2d 340 (La. 1976).
109. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West 1975). In 1978, the statute was amended to
make it gender neutral. See 1978 La. Acts 239, § 1, codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41
(West 1997).
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punish the rape of a male by a female.”110 Putting to one side “the physical
difficulty of the latter feat,” the court said: “[W]e do not find this legislative
classification of males as punishable by the crime unreasonable, not an
invidious discrimination against males so as to deny them the equal protection
of the laws: female rapes of males do not represent a social problem, although
male rapes of females do.”111 Louisiana’s acceptance of a unique physical
characteristics exception to the scope of the equal protection provision of the
state constitution may significantly affect its stance towards the recognition of
same-sex marriages.112
The Louisiana Supreme Court has determined that a gender-neutral law is
not subject to challenge under the third sentence of article I, section 3, merely
because it has a disparate impact on homosexuals. In State v. Baxley,113 the
supreme court held that a facially neutral statute making it a crime to solicit
another with the intent to engage in unnatural carnal copulation for
compensation was not unconstitutional. The court held that even though it
allegedly discriminated against homosexuals, there was no evidence that the
law had been enacted with the purpose of discriminating against
homosexuals.114 Similarly, there is no evidence that the prohibition of samesex marriage, which is gender neutral on its face, was intended to discriminate
against homosexuals.
9.

Maryland

Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, “Equality of
rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.”115 Early
Maryland cases quite clearly adopted an “absolutist” position, holding that
article 46 forbids all sex-based discrimination, without exceptions.116 Later

110. Fletcher, 341 So. 2d at 348.
111. Id.
112. See discussion infra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
113. State v. Baxley, 656 So. 2d 973 (La. 1995).
114. Id. at 978. See also State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501, 508-10 (La. 2000) (stating that state
privacy guarantee did not confer right to engage in acts of anal or oral sex). One of the delegates
at the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 noted that homosexuals were not a protected
class under the language of article I, section 3. See VI RECORDS, supra note 99, at 1024 (quoting
Delegate Arnette as remarking, “How about sexual beliefs, homosexuals, you are not protecting
them in any way whatsoever, maybe they ought to be listed as a class?”).
115. MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 46 (1981).
116. See Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900, 903 (Md. 1977) (stating that “language mandating
equality of rights can only mean that sex is not a factor” regarding child support obligations); Bell
v. Bell, 379 A.2d 419, 421 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (deciding that the common law
presumption that the husband is the dominant figure in the marriage relationship cannot stand
under the Equal Rights Amendment); Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 933 (Md. 1980)
(“Maryland’s law [allowing action for criminal conversation to be brought only by the husband]
provides different benefits for and imposes different burdens upon its citizens based solely upon
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cases, however, backed away from this absolutist position, and have adopted a
strict scrutiny standard.117 The shift from an absolutist standard, allowing no
sex-based classifications, other than those based on physical differences
between the sexes, to the strict scrutiny standard began in State v. Burning Tree
Club, Inc., in 1988.118 Two years before, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, after reviewing the earlier cases cited above, stated: “The Maryland
Court of Appeals has held . . . that the Equal Rights Amendment of the
Maryland Constitution prescribes an ‘absolute standard’ and not a balancing
test. Therefore, once discrimination is proved, a court cannot consider
arguments attempting to ‘balance’ the discriminatory practice against other
concerns.”119
The Maryland Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated that the purpose of
the state equal rights amendment was to eliminate discrimination in the law
between the treatment of men and the treatment of women. In Rand v.
Rand,120 the court of appeals, referring to the equal rights amendment, said that
“the people of Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men and
women.”121 What this means, according to the court, is that “‘[t]he law will
not impose different benefits or different burdens upon the members of society
based on the fact that they may be man or woman.’”122 In Kline v. Ansell,123
the court of appeals held that the common law rule allowing only a man to sue
sex. Such a result violates the ERA.”); Turner v. State, 474 A.2d 1297, 1301 (Md. 1984) (stating
that “a law that imposes different benefits and different burdens upon persons based solely upon
their sex violates the Maryland ERA” and striking down “Female Sitters Law,” which made it
unlawful for certain businesses to employ “female sitters,” women employees who would solicit
customers to buy food and beverages from them); Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d
817, 822 (Md. 1985) (providing that “the E.R.A. flatly prohibits gender-based classifications,
either under legislative enactments, governmental policies, or by application of common law
rules, in the allocation of benefits, burdens, rights and responsibilities as between men and
women”); id. at 825 (stating that “the Maryland E.R.A. absolutely forbids the determination of
such ‘rights,’ as may be accorded by law, solely on the basis of one’s sex, i.e., sex is an
impermissible factor in making any such determination”).
117. See Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648, 651 (Md. 1993) (“sex, like race, is a suspect
classification subject to strict scrutiny”) (use of peremptory challenges); Murphy v. Edmonds,
601 A.2d 102, 109, n.7 (Md. 1992) (“In Maryland . . . classifications based on gender are suspect
and subject to strict scrutiny.”); Briscoe v. P.G. County Health Dep’t, 593 A.2d 1109, 1115 n.7
(Md. 1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366, 387 (Md. 1988) (stating that “state
action providing for segregation based upon sex, absent substantial justification, violates the
E.R.A.” and that “[a]ny statute which discriminates on the basis of sex requires justification”).
118. Burning Tree Club, 554 A.2d 366.
119. Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 506 A.2d 263, 267 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986)
(upholding county ordinance banning sex discrimination in places of public accommodation).
120. Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900 (Md. 1977).
121. Id. at 905. In Rand, the court of appeals held that the legal obligation to provide child
support extends to both men and women. See id.
122. Id. at 903 (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1974)).
123. Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929 (Md. 1980).
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or be sued for criminal conversation could not be reconciled with article 46
because the rule “provides different benefits for and imposes different burdens
upon [Maryland] citizens based solely upon their sex.”124 Also, in Turner v.
State,125 the court struck down Maryland’s “Female Sitters Law,” which made
it unlawful for certain businesses to employ “female sitters,” women
employees who would solicit customers to buy food and beverages from them,
on the ground that a law that imposes different benefits and different burdens
upon persons based solely upon their sex violates the Maryland ERA.126 As
the court noted in Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum,127 “[t]he cases
construing equal rights amendments share a common thread; they generally
invalidate governmental action which imposes a burden on one sex but not the
other, or grants a benefit to one but not the other.”128
The Maryland statute prohibiting same-sex marriages129 does not
“impose[] a burden on one sex but not the other, or grant[] a benefit to one but
not the other”130 because neither men nor women may marry a person of the
same sex. Before “the protection afforded by the E.R.A. is triggered,” the
court of appeals has said, “there must be a denial or abridgement of equal
rights under the law as between men and women.”131 “Absent such a denial or
abridgement, the provisions of the E.R.A. simply have no application.”132
Because the prohibition of same-sex marriages does not discriminate “as
between men and women,” the state equal rights amendment is simply
inapplicable.133
That the Maryland equal rights amendment does not require recognition of
same-sex marriage is evident also in the court of appeals’ explanation of
purpose of the adopted amendment. Speaking of equal rights amendments
generally, the court stated: “That equal rights amendments to state
constitutions were prompted by a long history of denial of equal rights for

124. Id. at 933 (abolishing common law cause of action for criminal conversation).
125. Turner v. State, 474 A.2d 1297 (Md. 1984).
126. Id. at 1302. See also Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817, 822 (Md. 1985)
(plurality opinion) (stating that “the E.R.A. flatly prohibits gender-based classifications, either
under legislative enactments, governmental policies, or by application of common law rules, in
the allocation of benefits, burdens, rights and responsibilities as between men and women”).
127. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817.
128. Id. at 822 (plurality opinion).
129. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW, § 2-201 (1999).
130. Bainum, 501 A.2d at 825.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See 57 Op. Att’y Gen. 71 (Md. 1972) (explaining that Maryland law does not allow
same-sex marriage). Without discussing the possible application of the state equal rights
amendment, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has observed, in dicta, that “Maryland does
not recognize a marriage between persons of the same sex.” Jennings v. Jennings, 315 A.2d 816,
820 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
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women is well recognized.”134 “[T]he subordinate status of women in our
society has for all too many years been firmly entrenched in our legal system,
with women being excluded by law from various rights, obligations or
responsibilities.”135 The prohibition of same-sex marriage does not “exclude”
either women or men from a “right” available to the other sex. Neither may
marry someone of the same sex, but both may marry someone of the opposite
sex.
Although there is little case law on the point, Maryland courts appear to
recognize a “unique physical characteristics” exception to the scope of the
equal rights amendment. In Brooks v. State,136 the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals rejected an equal rights challenge to the common law definition of
rape as an offense which could be committed directly only by a male against a
female. The court stated: “[P]rotection of females from rape is both a
legitimate and essential legislative objective. Since only males can perpetrate
that crime as principals in the first degree, the limitation of culpability to males
constitutes a rational classification directly related to the objective of the
criminal penalty.”137 “The equality of the sexes,” the court commented,
“expresses a societal goal, not a physical metamorphosis.”138 “It would be
anomalous, indeed, if our aspirations toward the ideal of equality under the law
caused us to overlook our disparate human vulnerabilities.”139 Brooks was
cited with approval in Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum,140 where a plurality
of the court of appeals noted that “[d]isparate treatment on account of physical
characteristics unique to one sex is generally regarded as beyond the reach of
equal rights amendments.”141 Recognition of this exception may be significant
in defending the State’s prohibition of same-sex marriages, even on the
assumption that that prohibition is viewed as one based upon sex.142
The Maryland Declaration of Rights does not include an equal protection
provision. Nevertheless, “it is settled that the Due Process Clause of the
134. Bainum, 501 A.2d at 822.
135. Id. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted that the equal rights amendment is “a
two-edged sword in that it excises discrimination because of sex, but it does not halt with
eliminating discrimination only against females,” but also eliminates discrimination against
males. Hofmann v. Hofmann, 437 A.2d 247, 249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (adding that women,
like men, may be ordered to pay alimony in appropriate cases).
136. Brooks v. State, 330 A.2d 670 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
137. Id. at 673.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817 (Md. 1985).
141. Id. at 822 n.3 (citing Brooks). A fourth judge, writing for himself and two other
members of the court, acknowledged that “because of the inherent differences between the sexes,
some sex-based classifications may be justified after such scrutiny [referring to the strict scrutiny
standard of review].” Id. at 840 (Eldridge, J., concurring and dissenting).
142. See discussion infra notes 355-79 and accompanying text.
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Maryland Constitution, contained in Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights[],
embodies the concept of equal protection to the same extent as the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”143 Because Maryland has
no express equal protection clause, “Article 24 has been interpreted to apply
‘in like manner and to the same extent as the [Equal Protection Clause] of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.’”144 Thus, although the
Court of Appeals of Maryland may interpret the equal protection concept
embodied in article 24 independently from the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, “especially with respect to the
development of equal protection jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals has
virtually adopted Supreme Court precedent as controlling authority in the
interpretation of corresponding State constitutional law.”145 This “adoption” of
Supreme Court precedent strongly suggests that the Maryland court of appeals
would not recognize a right to same-sex marriage under article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights unless the United States Supreme Court
recognized such a right under the Equal Protection Clause.
10. Massachusetts
Part 1, article 1, of the Massachusetts Constitution provides:
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and
unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.
Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race,
color, creed or national origin.146

It is well established in Massachusetts case law that a statutory
classification based upon sex is subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the state
equal rights amendment and will be upheld “only if a compelling interest
justifies the classification and if the impact of the classification is limited as
narrowly as possible consistent with its proper purpose.”147 The Massachusetts

143. Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 107 (Md. 1992). Article 24 states: “That no man
sought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed,
or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the
judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 24
(1981).
144. Att’y Gen. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 941 (Md. 1981) (quoting U.S. Mortgage Co. v.
Matthews, 173 A. 903, 909 (Md. 1934), rev’d on other grounds, 293 U.S. 232 (1934)). See also
Gilchrist v. State, 667 A.2d 876, 884 n.3 (Md. 1995).
145. Manikhi v. Mass Transit Admin., 733 A.2d 372, 387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
146. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1. The equal rights amendment was added in 1976. Id.
147. Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Mass. 1980). See also Op. of Justices to
House of Reps., 371 N.E.2d 426, 428 (Mass. 1977) (“We believe that the application of the strict
scrutiny-compelling State interest test is required in assessing any governmental classification
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Supreme Judicial Court held that the equal rights amendment does not apply to
statutes that affect men and women equally. In Commonwealth v. King,148 the
court determined that the strict scrutiny standard of review mandated by the
state equal rights amendment for sex-based classifications did not apply to a
prostitution statute that made it a crime for both males and females to engage
in acts of prostitution.149 This is consistent with the supreme judicial court’s
understanding of the purpose of the equal rights amendment. Speaking of state
equal rights amendments generally, the court said:
Indeed, even if equal rights provisions could be viewed primarily as a means of
eradicating discrimination against women, they tend to protect men as well,
because disadvantages suffered by males are often premised on a “romantic
paternalism” stigmatizing to women. Although women have been the usual
victims of sex discrimination, there are significant exceptions to this
generality, for example, legislation imposing harsher criminal penalties on
men.150

Apparently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court views state equal
rights amendments as intended to eradicate both legal discrimination against
women in favor of men and discrimination against men in favor of women.
Nothing in the public policy of the non-recognition of same-sex marriages
violates this intention.
In Opinion of Justices to House of Representatives,151 the court said that a
proposed bill prohibiting women from participating with men on football and
wrestling teams would constitute impermissible sex discrimination.152 “A
prohibition of all females from voluntary participation in a particular sport
under every possible circumstance serves no compelling State interest.”153
Significantly, however, the court “decline[d] to express a view whether it
would be permissible under [the equal rights amendment] if equal facilities
were available for men and women in a particular sport which was available
separately to each sex.”154
In Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic
Association,155 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that an athletic
association rule, which provided that no boy could play on a girls’ team

based solely on sex.”); Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 206 (Mass. 1977) (“[W]e
conclude that the people of Massachusetts view sex discrimination with the same vigorous
disapproval as they view racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination.”).
148. King, 372 N.E.2d 196.
149. Id. at 204 n.10.
150. Att’y Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d 284, 290 (Mass. 1979).
151. See Op. of Justices, 371 N.E.2d 426.
152. Id. at 429-30.
153. Id. at 430.
154. Id.
155. Att’y Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979).
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although a girl could play on a boys’ team if that sport was not offered for
girls, violated the state equal rights amendment.156 Nevertheless, the court
minimized the impact of its decision, stating: “It can be expected that the
present decision will make little practical difference in the traditional conduct
of interscholastic athletic competition, for that will proceed in the great
majority of instances on a basis of ‘separate but equal’ teams whose validity is
assumed here.”157 The court’s casual assumption that “separate but equal”
access does not violate the state equal rights amendment suggests that the court
would not consider the public policy against same-sex marriages in the same
way as it would a prohibition of interracial marriage.158
Massachusetts recognizes a unique physical characteristics exception to its
equal rights amendment. In Lowell v. Kowalski,159 the supreme judicial court
said: “A distinction between rights to inherit from a natural father and rights to
inherit from a natural mother may properly be based on the greater difficulty of
proving paternity than of proving maternity.”160 This exception may have
significance in whether the state must recognize same-sex marriages.161
A gender-neutral law is not subject to an equal rights challenge solely on
the basis that it affects members of only one sex. In Commonwealth v. King,162
the supreme court held that a gender neutral prostitution statute was not subject
to the strict scrutiny mandated by the state equal rights amendment merely
because “most prostitutes are women.”163 Of course, limiting marriage to
members of the opposite sex does not “primarily affect” either sex. Given the
intent and construction of the state equal rights amendment, it is unlikely that
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would mandate state recognition of
same-sex marriages.
11. Montana
Article II, section 4, of the Montana Constitution provides:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm,
corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise

156. Id. at 296.
157. Id.
158. See infra notes 284-99 and accompanying text for the discussion of Lawrence v. State,
41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc).
159. Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135 (Mass. 1980).
160. Id. at 140 (relying upon Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 334 N.E.2d 613, 617-18 (Mass.
1975)).
161. See discussion infra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
162. Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1997).
163. Id. at 204 n.10.
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of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social
origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.164

Article II, section 4, was approved as part of the Bill of Rights at the
Montana Constitutional Convention of 1971-1972. The Bill of Rights
Committee noted “the need to include sex in any equal protection or freedom
from discrimination provisions” and “saw no reason for the state to wait for the
adoption of the federal Equal Rights Amendment” in order to accomplish that
objective.165 The committee’s report was restated on the floor of the
convention.166 Although the language of section 4 reaches private, as well as
public, acts of discrimination, the Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee,
Wade Dahood, denied that the proposal would affect the membership policies
of single-sex organizations.167 There was no indication in the debate over
article II, section 4, that the convention intended or believed that section 4
would affect the authority of the State to define marriage as a relationship
between one man and one woman.168
The limited utility of section 4 as a tool to strike down the State’s
prohibition of same-sex marriages169 may have been indicated by the Montana
Supreme Court’s decision in Gryczan v. State.170 In Gryczan, the supreme
court declared unconstitutional the State’s “deviate sexual conduct” statute171
as it applies to private, noncommercial homosexual conduct between
consenting adults. The court based its decision on the state constitution’s right
of privacy provision,172 not the equal protection and anti-discrimination
provisions of article II, section 4.173 Over the dissent of Chief Justice
Turnage,174 the majority opinion expressly refused to rest its decision on article
II, section 4.175

164. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
165. II PROCEEDINGS OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1971-1972, at
628, available at http://www.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgi/ds.py/View/Collection-1929 (last
visited June 19, 2002).
166. V id. at 1642.
167. Id. at 1644.
168. Id. at 1642-1646.
169. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(1)(d) (2001).
170. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
171. The statute prohibits any person from knowingly engaging in deviate sexual relations or
causing another to engage in deviate sexual relations. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (2001).
“Deviate sexual relations,” in turn, is defined as “sexual contact or sexual intercourse between
two persons of the same sex or any form of sexual intercourse with an animal.” MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-2-101(20) (2001).
172. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
173. See Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 120-26.
174. Id. at 126-28 (Turnage, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
175. Id. at 115.
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The Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Gryczan might suggest an
unwillingness to view homosexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect class under
the state constitution and a disinclination to mandate same-sex marriages. This
finds support in the supreme court’s decision in In re Estate of Kujath,176
where the court held that a statute affecting men and women equally does not
violate either the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution or article
II, section 4, of the Montana Constitution.
The Montana Supreme Court has not clearly articulated a standard of
review for sex discrimination under article II, section 4. The court recognizes
that the United States Supreme Court applies “intermediate scrutiny” to sexbased classifications.177 It has also fashioned its own “middle-tier” test where
specific directives in the Montana Constitution protect interests in education
and welfare.178 The court, however, has not yet determined which level of
scrutiny applies to sex-based classifications under article II, section 4, of the
Montana Constitution.179
In an early decision interpreting article II, section 4, the Montana Supreme
Court rejected a challenge to Montana’s former rape statute, which defined the
crime as one which could be directly committed only by a male against a
female.180 The supreme court noted that the vast majority of rapes were
committed by men.181 The court’s tacit acceptance of the “unique physical
characteristics” exception may have some significance with respect to the
State’s prohibition of same-sex marriages.182

176. In re Estate of Kujath, 545 P.2d 662 (Mont. 1976).
177. See Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Mont. 1986) (citing Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), for proposition that classification must be substantially related to
important government objective). See also Arneson v. State, 864 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (Mont.
1993) (restating intermediate scrutiny test but refusing to apply the test to age-based classification
absent constitutionally based directive).
178. See State ex rel. Bartmess v. Bd. of Trs., 726 P.2d 801, 804-05 (Mont. 1986) (holding
educational rights subject to constitutional protection thereby triggering “middle-tier” scrutiny);
Deaconess Med. Ctr. of Billings, Inc. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 720 P.2d 1165, 1168
(Mont. 1986) (holding abridgement of welfare demands more than rational basis review); Butte
Cmty. Union, 712 P.2d at 1313-14 (finding article XII, section 3(3) of the Montana Constitution
mandates greater protection of welfare rights). See also In re Wood, 768 P.2d 1370, 1375 (Mont.
1989) (recognizing that Montana employs a three-tier equal protection analysis).
179. See McKamey v. State, 885 P.2d 515, 521 (Mont. 1994) (stating that strict scrutiny
applies to classifications based on race or national origin); Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d
488, 502 (Mont. 1989) (identifying race and national origin as suspect classes); Cottrill v. Cottrill
Sodding Serv., 744 P.2d 895, 897 (Mont. 1987); Oberg v. City of Billings, 674 P.2d 494, 495
(Mont. 1983) (identifying “wealth, race, nationality and alienage” as “[e]xamples of suspect
criteria”).
180. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-5-301(1) (Smith 1947).
181. State v. Craig, 545 P.2d 649, 653 (Mont. 1976).
182. See discussion infra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
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The Montana Supreme Court has held that evidence of disparate impact,
standing alone, is insufficient to establish a violation of article II, section 4. In
State v. Spina,183 the court said that “it is a basic equal protection principle that
the invidious quality of a law claimed to be discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to an impermissibly discriminatory purpose.”184 The public policy
prohibiting same-sex marriages does not appear to discriminate between men
and women or have a disparate impact on either men or women.
Although rights of persons under the state equal protection clause “may be
greater than rights founded on the federal [equal protection] clause,”185 the
Montana Supreme Court “has consistently followed the lead of the United
States Supreme Court in interpreting the equal protection clauses of both the
state and federal constitutions.”186 This may suggest that the Montana
Supreme Court will apply the federal intermediate scrutiny standard to sexbased classifications challenged under the Montana equal rights amendment.
The absence of a developed body of law interpreting the state equal rights
provision makes it difficult to predict how the Montana Supreme Court would
evaluate a claim that article II, section 4, requires the State to sanction samesex marriages. Nevertheless, given the purpose of the provision and the
supreme court’s recognition of the unique physical characteristics exception,
the public policy of restricting marriage to one man and one woman should
withstand challenge.
12. New Hampshire
Part 1, article 2, of the New Hampshire Constitution provides:
All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights–among which are,
the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this state on
account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin.187

183. State v. Spina, 982 P.2d 421 (Mont. 1999).
184. Id. at 437 (interpreting Equal Protection Clause and article II, section 4, of the Montana
Constitution). See also Crabtree v. Mont. State Library, 665 P.2d 231, 235 (Mont. 1983) (stating
that gender-neutral statute giving veterans preferences in public employment did not discriminate
against women merely because the vast majority of the military who would be entitled to the
preference is comprised of men).
185. Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 500 (Mont. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, Meech v.
Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 501 (Mont. 1989).
186. In re Mont. Pac. Oil & Gas Co., 614 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Mont. 1980). See also In re C.H.,
683 P.2d 931, 938 (Mont. 1984) (“The equal protection provisions of the federal and state
constitutions are similar and provide generally equivalent but independent protections.”); Emery
v. State, 580 P.2d 445, 449 (Mont. 1978); McKamey v. State, 885 P.2d 515, 521 (Mont. 1994)
(equating review under article II, section 4, with review under the Equal Protection Clause).
187. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2. The second sentence was added in 1974 to “insure that all men
and women, all ethnic and racial groups in New Hampshire are treated equitably and, most
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court applies the strict scrutiny standard of
review to sex-based classifications.
In Cheshire Medical Center v.
Holbrook,188 the court discussed the common law doctrine of necessaries,
under which a husband is legally responsible for necessities provided to his
wife, but a wife is not similarly responsible for necessities provided to her
husband.189 The doctrine could not be reconciled with the judicial scrutiny
mandated by the second sentence of article 2. The court stated that “[i]n order
to withstand scrutiny under this provision [part 1, article 2], a common law rule
that distributes benefits or burdens on the basis of gender must be necessary to
serve a compelling State interest.”190 Rather than abolishing the doctrine, the
court chose to extend its benefits and burdens to husbands and wives
equally.191
In In re Opinion of the Justices,192 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
found no state or federal constitutional impediment to a proposed bill that
would prohibit homosexuals from adopting children or being licensed as adult
members of foster families.193 Addressing the federal equal protection issue
first, the supreme court observed that “homosexuals do not constitute a suspect
class, nor are they within the ambit of the so-called ‘middle tier’ level of
heightened scrutiny, as sexual preference is not a matter necessarily tied to
gender, but rather to inclination, whatever the source thereof.”194 After noting
importantly, have some recourse in our courts in case of discrimination.” N.H. CONVENTION TO
REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 153 (May 1974) (presenting comments of Delegate Schlesinger); see
also id. at 154-156 (providing comments of Delegates Gratton, Raiche and Arnold).
188. Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344 (N.H. 1995).
189. Under this doctrine, “a husband has the duty to support his wife and is responsible for
the cost of necessary goods and services furnished to his wife by third parties if he has failed to
provide the necessaries himself.” Mark S. Brennan, The New Doctrine of Necessaries in
Virginia, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 317 (1985). Because “the husband and the wife were
considered one legal entity–their two identities merging upon marriage so that the husband’s
identity subsumed that of the wife,” the married woman was “legally incapable of incurring any
obligations independent of her husband so that she was completely dependent upon him for
providing items necessary to her maintenance.” Id. at 318-19. The husband’s duty to support his
wife included the cost of necessaries provided to his wife by third parties. “Liability was based
on the husband’s presumed failure to provide the necessaries himself, or upon the theory that the
wife was acting as his agent when she bought the necessaries.” Id. at 319. Accordingly, “[a]
creditor could sell necessaries to the wife and rely upon the law to force the husband to pay for
them.” Id. A wife, however, was not liable for necessaries provided to her husband who could
contract for them himself. Id.
190. Cheshire Med. Ctr., 663 A.2d at 1347 (citing LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350, 1355
(N.H. 1993) (stating, in dicta, that sex-discrimination is subject to the strict scrutiny standard of
review)).
191. Cheshire Med. Ctr., 663 A.2d at 1346-47.
192. In re Op. of Justices, 30 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
193. The court, however, found that a provision in the bill prohibiting homosexuals from
operating child care agencies would not pass constitutional muster. See id. at 25-26.
194. Id. at 24.
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that there is no “fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,”195 the
court concluded that because “no suspect or quasi-suspect class or fundamental
right is involved, the proper test to apply in determining the bill’s
constitutionality for federal equal protection purposes is whether the legislation
is ‘rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.’”196
In proposing House Bill 70, the New Hampshire House of Representatives
found that, “‘as a matter of public policy, the provision of a healthy
environment and a role model for our children should exclude homosexuals . . .
from participating in governmentally sanctioned programs of adoption, foster
care and day care.’”197 The House found further that “‘being a child in such
programs is difficult enough without the added social and psychological
complexities that a homosexual lifestyle could produce.’”198 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court determined that, with respect to the prohibition of
homosexuals adopting children or being licensed as adult members of foster
families, the bill was rationally related to its stated purpose, being “to provide
appropriate role models for children.”199 The legislature, in the court’s view,
“can rationally act on the theory that a role model can influence the child’s
developing sexual identity.”200 “[I]t is in those living situations . . . that the
role model theory provides a rational basis on which to exclude
homosexuals . . . because it is in the familial context that the theory of learned
sexual preference is most likely to be true.”201
The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s analysis of the state equal
protection issue mainly followed its federal equal protection analysis. The
court reiterated that “no suspect class is involved, nor is heightened scrutiny
requiring application of the fair and substantial relationship test . . .
appropriate.”202 The court determined that the proper test under the state
constitution was the rational relationship test and again found that the proposed
legislation was “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose [to
avoid homosexual influence on the child’s developing sexual identity] insofar
as it applies to adoption and foster care.”203
The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Opinion of the
Justices strongly suggests that the state’s prohibition of same-sex marriages204

195. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
196. Id. (citation omitted).
197. In re Op. of Justices, 530 A.2d at 23 (quoting N.H. H.R. Res. 32).
198. Id. (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 25.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 26.
202. In re Op. at Justices, 530 A.2d at 26 (citation omitted).
203. Id.
204. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1, 457:2 (1992). In 1997, the New Hampshire
legislature amended its civil rights statutes to include protection from discrimination on account
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does not violate the equal rights guarantee contained in part 1, article 2 of New
Hampshire’s Constitution. Although the court’s emphasis in In re Opinion of
the Justices was on the impact of adult homosexuality upon children, in either
adopted or in foster care, the court’s unwillingness to view homosexuals as a
suspect class or even deserving of “middle tier” scrutiny indicates that an
asserted claim to homosexual marriage would be resolved on the rational basis
standard of review. Moreover, the state’s prohibition of same-sex marriages
reinforces the concerns raised in In re Opinion of the Justices that adopted
children be given appropriate role models in developing their sexual identity.
Finally, David Souter, now a Member of the United States Supreme Court,
concurred in the majority opinion in In re Opinion of the Justices when he was
a justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court.205 In light of the decision in
In re Opinion of the Justices, it is implausible that the New Hampshire
Supreme Court would compel the State to recognize same-sex marriages.
13. New Mexico
Article II, section 18, of the New Mexico Constitution provides: “No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law;
nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Equality of rights
under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person.”206
In New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson,207 the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the 1972 amendment to article II, section 18, which
added the second sentence, mandated the strict scrutiny standard of judicial
review for gender-based classifications.208 The supreme court determined that
the equal rights amendment was intended to provide “a legal remedy for the
invidious consequences of the gender-based discrimination that prevailed
under the common law and civil law traditions that preceded it.”209 The
“gender-based discrimination” to which the court referred was historical
discrimination against women.210 Given the court’s explanation of the genesis
and purpose of section 18, which was to provide equal rights for women, it
does not appear that the public policy of prohibiting same-sex marriages runs

of sexual orientation. 1997 N.H. Laws 88-93, ch. 108. The bill in question, however, expressly
provided: “Nothing in this act shall be interpreted to permit adoptions by homosexuals or to allow
marriage of persons of the same sex.” 1997 N.H. Laws 93, ch. 108, § 17. The statutory
prohibition of adoption by homosexuals, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1994), was
repealed in 1999. See 1999 N.H. Laws 43, ch. 18, § 2.
205. In re Op. of Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 28 (N.H. 1987) (noting concurrences).
206. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
207. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998).
208. Id. at 853-54, 856, 857. In New Mexico Right to Choose, the court struck down an
administrative regulation restricting public funding of abortion. Id.
209. Id. at 853.
210. Id. at 852-55.
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afoul of the amendment. The prohibition of same-sex marriages, after all,
affects men and women equally: Neither may marry members of the opposite
sex.
Apart from certain language in the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision
in New Mexico Right to Choose,211 there is little precedent in New Mexico’s
equal rights jurisprudence that distinct physical characteristics between the
sexes will support a difference in treatment directly related to those
characteristics. Other sources interpreting the intent of the amendment’s
sponsors and the public’s understanding of the amendment, however, are more
revealing. Like other states, New Mexico provides an official summary of
arguments for and against proposed constitutional amendments. One of the
arguments made in favor of the amendment was that it would “prohibit the
state from enacting any law or having any law on its books which imposes
legal distinctions based on sex.”212 The same argument conceded, however,
that “[t]he proposed amendment does not pretend to eliminate natural
physiological differences between the sexes.”213 This was confirmed in a
newspaper interview with Senator Tibo Chavez, one of the sponsors of the bill
that put the equal rights amendment on the ballot. Senator Chavez denied that
the amendment, if ratified, would require the state to recognize single-sex
marriage.214
The contemporary understanding of the sponsors and the public that the
amendment would not preclude distinctions based on actual physical
differences between the sexes is supported by the academic literature.
Introducing a symposium issue on the implications of the equal rights
amendment, written before the amendment was ratified, but published
afterwards, Professor Leo Kanowitz noted that the amendment would not apply
“in those very rare and narrowly defined circumstances where discernable sexbased biological differences clearly justify sex distinctions in the law.”215
211. The court acknowledged that “not all classifications based on physical characteristics
unique to one sex are instances of invidious discrimination.” N.M. Right to Choose/NARDL, 975
P.2d at 854. Nevertheless, “a classification based on a unique physical characteristic” may not be
used as a pretext to impose “restrictions on women’s ability to work and participate in public
life.” Id. The court’s acknowledgment that some classifications based on unique physical
characteristics may not offend the state equal rights amendment may have some bearing on the
whether the State must recognition same-sex marriage. See discussion infra notes 355-72 and
accompanying text.
212. NEW MEXICO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SERVICE, CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS:
AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE 1972 LEGISLATURE AND ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 9, ¶
10 (1972).
213. Id.
214. See Women’s Equal Rights Resolution Clears Final Legislative Hurdle, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Feb. 16, 1972, at A-5.
215. Leo Kanowitz, The New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment: Introduction and Overview, 3
N.M. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973). Professor Kanowitz expressed the same view in a newspaper interview
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Writing in the same symposium issue, Professor Charles Daniels expressed the
view that state abortion statutes “could be upheld against an Equal Rights
challenge on the basis of the ‘unique physical characteristics’ test.”216 Not one
contributor to the issue suggested that the amendment would require
recognition of same-sex marriages.
Apart from the equality of rights language in the second sentence of article
II, section 18, it is unlikely that the equal protection language in the first
sentence of section 18 will be interpreted more broadly than the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, in Richardson v.
Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc.,217 the New Mexico Supreme Court stated
that “[t]he tests for reviewing equal protection challenges generally are the
same under New Mexico and federal law.”218 Furthermore, in Garcia v.
Albuquerque Public Schools Board of Education,219 the New Mexico Court of
Appeals held, “[t]he standards for violation of the equal protection clauses of
the United States and New Mexican Constitutions are the same.”220 The New
Mexico Supreme Court later adopted the reasoning in Garcia, stating, “New
Mexico has long applied the same tests of reasonableness and relationship [to
equal protection challenges brought under article II, section 18] as has the
United States Supreme Court [to challenges brought under the Equal
Protection Clause].”221 In light of this parallel construction, if the recognition
of same-sex marriages is not required by the Equal Protection Clause, then it
would not be required under its state equivalent.
14. Pennsylvania
Article I, section 28, of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “Equality
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.”222 Although, as the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, “the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has not addressed the proper level of scrutiny under the
published before the ratification vote. See Susanne Burks, Wide Impact Seen For Amendment,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 18, 1972, at B-1.
216. Charles W. Daniels, The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on the New Mexico
Criminal Code, 3 N.M. L. REV. 106, 111 n.32 (1973).
217. Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 763 P.2d 1153 (N.M. 1988), overruled on
other grounds, Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 305, 315 (N.M. 1998).
218. Richardson, 763 P.2d at 1158. See also Gallegos v. Southwest Cmty. Health Servs., 872
P.2d 899, 905 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that “the tests for reviewing equal protection
challenges are the same under New Mexico and federal law”) (citing Richardson); Mieras v.
Dyncorp, 925 P.2d 518, 525 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
219. Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 622 P.2d 699 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), writ
quashed, 622 P.2d 1046 (N.M. 1981).
220. Garcia, 622 P.2d at 701.
221. Meyer v. Jones, 749 P.2d 93, 96 (N.M. 1988).
222. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
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E.R.A.,”223 the case law strongly suggests that Pennsylvania follows an
“absolutist” approach to sex-based classifications, so that if the classification is
based on sex, it is invalid unless it is based upon physical differences between
the sexes.
In Henderson v. Henderson,224 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying
upon article I, section 28, declared unconstitutional a former statute that
allowed the payment of temporary alimony, attorney fees and expenses to the
wife in a divorce action, but not the husband.225 The court explained:
[A]s it is appropriate for the law where necessary to force the man to provide
for the needs of a dependent wife, it must also provide a remedy for the man
where circumstances justify an entry of support against the wife. In short, the
right of support depends not upon the sex of the petitioner but rather upon need
in view of the relative financial circumstances of the parties.226

Furthermore, the court stated that “[t]he sex of citizens of this Commonwealth
is no longer a permissible factor in the determination of their legal rights and
legal responsibilities.”227 In Commonwealth v. Butler,228 the supreme court, in
striking down discriminatory parole eligibility rules, said that “sex may no
longer be accepted as an exclusive classifying tool.”229 But in Fischer v.
Department of Public Welfare,230 the court rejected a challenge to statutory
restrictions on public funding of abortions, explaining that the restrictions were
aimed at abortion as a medical procedure, not women as a class, and that the
ability of only women to conceive and bear children took the restrictions out of
the scope of the equal rights amendment:
[W]e cannot accept [the] appellants’ rather simplistic argument that because
only a woman can have an abortion then the statute [restricting public funding
of abortion] necessarily utilizes “sex as a basis for distinction” . . . . To the
contrary, the basis for the distinction here is not sex but abortion, [ ] and the
statute does not accord varying benefits to men and women because of their
sex, but accords varying benefits to one class of women, as distinct from
another, based on a voluntary choice made by the women [whether to carry the
child to term or have an abortion].
The mere fact that only women are affected by this statute does not
necessarily mean that women are being discriminated against on the basis of
sex. In this world there are certain immutable facts of life which no amount of
223. Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 1993).
224. Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974) (referring to this provision as article I,
section 27, by mistake in the majority opinion).
225. Id. at 62.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1974).
229. Id. at 855.
230. Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985)
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legislation may change. As a consequence there are certain laws which
necessarily will only affect one sex. Although we have not previously
addressed this situation, other ERA jurisdictions have; and the prevailing view
amongst our sister state jurisdictions is that the E.R.A. “does not prohibit
differential treatment [between] the sexes when, as here that treatment is
reasonably and genuinely based on physical characteristics unique to one
sex.”231

Summarizing these cases, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court stated:
“The only types of sexual discrimination that have been permitted in this
Commonwealth are those which are “reasonably and genuinely based on
physical characteristics unique to one sex. [citing Fischer v. Dep’t of Public
Welfare, 502 A.2d 114, 125 (Pa. 1985)]. All other types of sexual
discrimination have been outlawed in this Commonwealth.”232
Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s explanation of the purpose of the
state equal rights amendment, it would not appear that the amendment could be
used to establish a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage. In
Commonwealth v. Butler,233 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that “the
purpose of this constitutional provision was to end discriminatory treatment on
account of sex.”234 In Hopkins v. Blanco,235 the supreme court stated: “The
obvious purpose of the Amendment was to put a stop to the invalid
discrimination which was based on the sex of the person. The Amendment
gave legal recognition to what society had long recognized, that men and
women must have equal status in today’s world.”236
Also, in Henderson v. Henderson,237 the court said:
The thrust of the Equal Rights Amendment is to insure equality of rights under
the law and to eliminate sex as a basis for distinction. The sex of citizens of
this Commonwealth is no longer a permissible factor in the determination of
their legal rights and legal responsibilities. The law will not impose different

231. Id. at 125 (citations and footnote omitted). The supreme court’s recognition of the
“unique physical characteristics” test may provide a basis for upholding the State’s prohibition of
same-sex marriages, even if the prohibition is viewed as one based on sex. See discussion infra
notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
232. Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (citations omitted),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 563 A.2d 1390 (Pa. 1989). See also George v. George, 409
A.2d 1, 1 (Pa. 1979) (stating there is no “domestic relations” exception to the scope of the state
equal rights amendment).
233. Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1974).
234. Id. at 855.
235. Hopkins v. Blanco, 320 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1974).
236. Id. at 140 (extending common law right to recover damages for loss of consortium to
wives, as well as to husbands).
237. Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974).
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benefits or different burdens upon the members of a society based on the fact
that they may be man or woman.238

The Pennsylvania reviewing courts have recognized that a statute or
judicial doctrine that favors neither men nor women does not violate the equal
rights amendment.239 Thus, in Laspino v. Rizzo,240 the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings a trial
court order entering summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Laspino
involved a challenge to a municipal ordinance prohibiting massage parlor
employees from massaging persons of the opposite sex. The commonwealth
court held that the lower court erred in applying “Pennsylvania’s absolute
E.R.A. standard” to strike down a “facially neutral ordinance.”241 Moreover,
the Commonwealth’s statute prohibiting of same-sex marriages would not
appear to violate the state equal rights amendment because the statute is
facially neutral and was not enacted with the intent to discriminate against
either men or women.
In a pair of recent cases currently under review by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that one homosexual domestic partner may not adopt the
children of the other partner unless that partner relinquishes his or her own
238. Id. at 62. See also Swidzinski v. Schultz, 493 A.2d 93, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (stating
the Equal Rights Amendment was “not meant merely to benefit women,” a deceased husband’s
estate was insufficient to pay his funeral expenses, those expenses, to the extent of the
insufficiency, should be charged to his surviving wife, as her share in the burdens arising out of
the marital relationship); DeRosa v. DeRosa, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 71, 73-74 (1972) (finding that
regarding the proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment and the adopted state equal rights
amendment, “[b]oth amendments recognize the fact that heretofore women in American society
have been assigned to a different status than men and have not been accorded the same legal
rights, opportunities or responsibilities as men”).
239. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Finnegan, 421 A.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
(finding a gender neutral prostitution statute did not implicate the equal rights amendment); Smith
v. Smith, 361 A.2d 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (upholding interspousal tort immunity doctrine).
See also Hon. Phyllis W. Beck & Joanne Alfano Baker, An Analysis of the Impact of the
Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 743, 798 (1994) (stating the Equal
Rights Amendment “equalized the legal burdens and benefits of men and women”).
240. Laspino v. Rizzo, 398 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
241. Id. at 1073. See also Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 524 F.2d 571 (3d
Cir. 1975) (rejecting federal constitutional challenge to same ordinance); Vorchheimer v. Sch.
Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff’d 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (rejecting federal
equal protection challenge to local school board policy of maintaining all male and all female
public schools). But see Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682, 709 (1983)
(invalidating separate public high schools for boys and girls, “under Pennsylvania’s ERA, the
separate-but-equal concept . . . does not have currency”); Commonwealth v. Pa. Interscholastic
Athletic Ass’n, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (dictum) (stating equality of rights
under the law is denied to high school girls who are capable of playing on boys’ teams, but are
denied the opportunity to do so, “even where separate teams are offered for boys and girls in the
same sport”).
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parental rights.242 Although the court did not address any constitutional issues
in either opinion, in each case it did note the “strong and longstanding public
policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one
woman.”243 It also noted the statutory definition of marriage as “a ‘civil
contract by which one man and one woman take each other for husband and
wife.’”244 In the course of each opinion, the court said that it was for the
legislature, not the courts, to determine whether same-sex marriage should be
permitted.245
Pennsylvania has two other constitutional provisions in its Declaration of
Rights that guarantee equal protection. Article I, section 1, provides that “[a]ll
men are born equally free and independent.”246 Article I, section 26, provides:
“Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to
any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any
person in the exercise of any civil right.”247 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that “[t]he equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution
are analyzed by this Court under the same standards used by the United States
Supreme Court when reviewing equal protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”248 Given the similarity of standards, article I, sections 1 and 26,
of the Pennsylvania Constitution most likely will not be interpreted to confer a
right to same-sex marriages unless the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is so interpreted.
15. Texas
The Texas equal rights amendment provides: “Equality under the law shall
not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national

242. See In re Adoption of C.C.G. & Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), allocatur
granted, Aug. 8, 2001; In re Adoption of R.B.F. & R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000),
allocatur granted, Aug. 8, 2001.
243. In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762 A.2d at 728 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704
(West 2001)); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 762 A.2d at 742 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704
(West 2001)).
244. In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762 A.2d at 728 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102
(West 2001)); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 762 A.2d at 742 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102
(West 2001)).
245. In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762 A.2d at 728; In re Adoption of R.B.F., 762 A.2d at 743. In
De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held
that Pennsylvania does not recognize same-sex, common law marriages. Id. at 953-56. The court
declined to decide whether the Commonwealth’s refusal to recognize such “marriages” violates
the state equal rights amendment because the plaintiffs had not raised that issue in the lower
court. Id. at 956.
246. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
247. PA. CONST. art. I, § 26.
248. Love v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 597 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa. 1991).
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origin.”249 In In re McLean,250 the Texas Supreme Court held that sex-based
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.251 In so ruling, the court refused to
adopt “a per se standard which would automatically invalidate gender-based
distinctions.”252
Texas courts consistently recognize a unique physical characteristics
exception to the equality of rights mandate of article I, section 3a.253 In Finley
v. State,254 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected an equal rights
challenge to the former Texas rape statute.255 Under that statute, only a man,
and not a woman, could be the “actual perpetrator” of the offense256 and only
women, and not men, could be the victims. The court noted that rape is a
crime more likely to be committed by men than by women, and that such
sexual assaults “carry with them the danger of serious bodily injury.”257
Additionally, the court held that “a unique characteristics test can be applied to
justify the statutory classification.”258 “Hymen and uterine injury to female
rape victims, the possibility of pregnancy, and the physiological difficulty of a
woman forcing a man to have sexual intercourse with her all suggest a
justification for the sexual distinction embodied in [the rape statute].”259
In Mercer v. Board of Trustees of North Forest Independent School
District,260 the Texas Court of Appeals held that a dispute over a hair-length
regulation that applied only to high school boys, and not to high school girls,
was nonjusticiable.261 In the course of its opinion, however, the court,

249. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
250. In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1987).
251. Id. at 698. In McLean, the supreme court struck down a statute making it more difficult
for men than for women to legitimate illegitimate children.
252. Id.
253. As to the possible significance of this exception with respect to the question of same-sex
marriages, see discussion infra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
254. Finley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), disavowed in part, Ex parte
Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc), reaffirmed, Carpenter v. State,
639 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
255. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (Vernon 1974), repealed by 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws ch.
997, § 12. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (Vernon 1994) (prohibiting offense of sexual
assault).
256. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(3) (Vernon 1974) (providing the definition of “sexual
intercourse” to be “any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ”).
257. Finley, 527 S.W.2d at 556.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Mercer v. Bd. of Trs., 538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
261. Id. at 206-07. See also Barber v. Colo. Indep. Sch. Dist., 901 S.W.2d 447, 449-51 (Tex.
1995) (holding that controversies over hair-length regulations in public schools are not justiciable
under the state equal rights amendment); Bd. of Trs. v. Toungate, 958 S.W.2d 365, 372-73 (Tex.
1997) (declining to reconsider and overrule Barber).
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anticipating the Texas Supreme Court’s later decision in In re McLean,262
rejected the view that the state equal rights amendment “admits of no
exception to its prohibition of sex discrimination.”263 One exception the court
recognized in Mercer was a classification required by “physical
characteristics.”264 With respect to this exception, the court stated that it was
“simply recognizing the facts of life.”265 The court also provided: “For us to
adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd.
Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as
to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.”266
A pair of Texas cases challenged a Dallas municipal ordinance restricting
the location of sexually oriented businesses. The Texas Court of Appeals
refined the physical characteristics test adopted in Mercer. In MJR’s Fare of
Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas267 and Messina v. State,268 the court of appeals
held that the party challenging a law based on the state equal rights amendment
must show that the contested law discriminates against one sex solely on the
basis of gender. The proponent of the law can overcome that requirement if he
shows that physical characteristics form the sex-based distinction. If the
proponent cannot overcome the initial premise, then the proponent must show
that “no other means exist to protect the state’s compelling interest.”269
In both cases, the court of appeals rejected a challenge to a Dallas zoning
ordinance restricting the area in which sexually oriented businesses could
operate. The ordinance defined a sexually oriented business as an adult
cabaret,270 which in turn was defined as a bar regularly featuring persons
performing in a state of nudity.271 “State of nudity” included dress that failed
to cover opaquely the areola of the female breast.272 In MJR’s Fare of Dallas,
Inc., the court held that the ordinance’s inclusion of the term, “areola of the
female breast” without a similar requirement for male performers did not
unconstitutionally discriminate against females in violation of the equal rights
amendment.
“Dallas introduced undisputed expert testimony that (1)
physiological and sexual distinctions exist between the male and female breast;

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1987).
Mercer, 538 S.W.2d at 206.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MJR’s Fare of Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 792 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App. 1990).
Messina v. State, 904 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App. 1995).
MJR’s Fare of Dallas, Inc., 792 S.W.2d at 575. See also Messina, 904 S.W.2d at 181.
DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE § 41A-2(3) (1993).
Id. § 41A-2(3)(A).
Id. § 41A-2(15)(B).
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(2) female breasts differ both internally and externally from male breasts; and
(3) the female breast, but not the male breast, is a mammary gland.”273
The court agreed with the City of Dallas that, because the plaintiff had
offered no evidence to rebut this testimony, the plaintiff had failed to show that
the ordinance discriminated against females solely on the basis of gender.274 In
Messina, the court of appeals rejected a second challenge to the same
ordinance on the basis of its earlier decision.275
In Boutwell v. State,276 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered a
challenge to the sexual abuse of child statute that provided, as a defense to
prosecution, that the victim was of the opposite sex, fourteen years old or older
at the time of the offense and had previously engaged promiscuously in sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse.277 In Boutwell, the defendant
claimed that the statutory defense violated the federal Equal Protection Clause
and the state equal rights amendment because the defense was available only in
cases where the victim was of the opposite sex, and not also in cases where the
perpetrator and the victim were of the same sex.278 The court noted that “a
female defendant situated similarly to appellant–that is, a female who had
engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with a child 14 years or older who was
of the same sex–would likewise be denied the ‘promiscuity’ defense.”279
Additionally, the court found that defendant’s argument “proceeds upon a
fallacy of amphiboly: his complaint is not that he is discriminated against on
the basis of ‘sex’ in the sense of ‘gender;’ but rather, that his ‘sex’ act is
entitled to protection equal to that given heterosexual conduct under the law as
stated in s[ection] 21.10(b).”280 The court rejected the defendant’s argument
because it found no authority on which to hold that “homosexual conduct is a
constitutionally protected activity under the Equal Protection Clause or the
State Equal Rights Amendment.”281

273. MJR’s Fare of Dallas, Inc., 792 S.W.2d at 575.
274. Id.
275. Messina v. State, 904 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. App. 1996). But see Williams v. City of
Forth Worth, 782 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App. 1989) (holding a similar ordinance unconstitutional
where the defendant city presented no evidence that prohibiting exposure of female, but not male,
breasts, was justified by physical differences between men and women).
276. Boutwell v. State, 719 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc), disavowed on
other grounds, Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc).
277. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.10(b) (1974), repealed by 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws ch.
997, § 12.
278. Boutwell, 719 S.W.2d at 167-69.
279. Id. at 169.
280. Id.
281. Id. In State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203-05 (Tex. App. 1992), the Texas Court of
Appeals declared unconstitutional the state sodomy law on the ground that the statute violated an
implied right of privacy. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1994). The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court with
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More recently, the Texas Court of Appeals considered a multifaceted
attack on the Texas sodomy statute. Under that statute, a person commits the
offense of “homosexual conduct” when he “engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”282 “Deviate sexual
intercourse,” in turn, is defined as “any contact between any part of the genitals
of one person and the mouth or anus of another person” or “the penetration of
the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.”283
In Lawrence v. State,284 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld
section 21.06 against an array of state and federal constitutional challenges.
Importantly, the defendants argued that the sodomy statute discriminates on
account of sex in violation of the state equal rights amendment because it
prohibits only homosexual, and not also heterosexual, deviate sexual
conduct.285 The State defended the statute on the ground that it applies equally
to men and women, stating that “two men engaged in homosexual conduct face
the same sanctions as two women.”286 The defendants replied that a similar
rationale was expressly rejected in Loving v. Virginia,287 where the Supreme
Court struck down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute.288 The court of
appeals rejected the Loving analogy:
[W]hile the purpose of Virginia’s miscegenation statute was to segregate the
races and perpetuate the notion that blacks are inferior to whites, no such
sinister motive can be ascribed to the criminalization of homosexual conduct.
In other words, we find nothing in the history of Section 21.06 to suggest [that]
it was intended to promote any hostility between the sexes, preserve any
unequal treatment as between men and women, or perpetuate any societal or
cultural bias with regard to gender. Thus, we find [defendants’] reliance on
Loving unpersuasive.289

directions to dismiss the complaint because the court lacked equity jurisdiction to consider a
constitutional challenge to a criminal statute in the context of a declaratory judgment action.
State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. 1994). A judgment that a court lacked jurisdiction to
enter cannot be considered a precedent. In any event, there is an obvious distinction between
limitations on the State’s power to criminalize noncommercial sexual conduct engaged in by
consenting adults in private and its obligation to give public recognition to a homosexual
relationship. See Boulding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (per
curiam) (reversing court of appeals holding that statute limiting promiscuity defense to
heterosexual assaults violated the Equal Protection Clause).
282. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 1994).
283. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1) (Vernon 1994).
284. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc).
285. Id. at 357.
286. Id.
287. Id.; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
288. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 357.
289. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 357-58. The Loving analogy seems inapt on purely logical
grounds. The statute struck down in Loving prohibited marriages between members of different
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Noting that “[t]he mere allusion to gender is not a talisman of
constitutional invalidity,”290 the court of appeals held that “[i]f a statute does
not impose burdens or [confer] benefits upon a particular gender, it does not
subject individuals to unequal treatment.”291 Although section 21.06 “includes
the word ‘sex,’ it does not elevate one gender over the other. Neither does it
impose burdens on one gender not shared by the other.”292 Because the
sodomy statute is “gender-neutral on its face,” the court held that defendants
had the burden “of showing [that] the statute has had an adverse effect upon
one gender and that such disproportionate impact can be traced to a
discriminatory purpose.”293 The defendants, however, made no attempt to
establish, nor did they even claim, that “Section 21.06 has had any disparate
impact between men and women.”294 “Rather, [defendants] complain only that
the statute has had a disparate impact between homosexuals and heterosexuals.
While we recognize [that] the statute may adversely affect the conduct of male
and female homosexuals, this simply does not raise the specter of gender-based
discrimination.”295 Adverting to its earlier discussion of “sexual
orientation,”296 the court held that “[t]o the extent [that] the statute has a
disproportionate impact on homosexual conduct, the statute is supported by a
legitimate state interest,” such as “preserving public morals.”297 The State’s

races, not between members of the same race. The equivalent, in the area of sex, of an antimiscegenation statute would not be a statute prohibiting marriage between members of the same
sex, but one prohibiting marriage between members of the opposite sex, an absurdity that no state
has ever contemplated. The equivalent, in the area of race, of a statute prohibiting same-sex
marriage, would be a statute that prohibited marriage between members of the same race. Laws
banning marriages between members of the same race would be unconstitutional, not because
they would “segregate the races and perpetuate the notion that blacks are inferior to whites,” but
because there could be no possible rational basis for such laws. Id. Laws against same-sex
marriages, on the other hand, are supported by a multitude of reasons. As Professor Richard
Duncan has observed, “[c]onventional marriage laws reasonably advance many legitimate
governmental interests,” which may include safeguarding public morality, encouraging childbirth
within marriage, promoting the undeniable advantages of dual-gender parenting, not placing
society’s “stamp of approval” on homosexual relationships and avoiding a slippery slope of
intended and unintended consequences of recognizing same-sex marriages. Richard F. Duncan,
The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage:
A (Partial) Response to Professor Koppelman, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 147, 158-165
(1997).
290. Lawrence, 41 S.W.2d. at 359.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Lawrence, 41 S.W.2d. at 359.
296. Id. at 353-57.
297. Id. at 359.
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prohibition of same-sex marriages would easily satisfy this more relaxed
standard of judicial review.
Clearly, Lawrence supports the prohibition of same-sex marriages. If the
State can criminalize homosexual conduct without implicating the equal rights
amendment, then it necessarily has the authority to limit marriage to one man
and one woman. Like the statute making homosexual sodomy a crime, the
statute prohibiting same-sex marriages298 is gender-neutral on its face.
Moreover, nothing in the history of that statute suggests that the prohibition
was “intended to promote any hostility between the sexes, preserve any
unequal treatment as between men and women, or perpetuate any societal or
cultural bias with regard to gender.”299
The Texas Supreme Court has not yet determined whether, for purposes of
the state equal protection guarantees,300 evidence of a foreseeable, but
unintended, disproportionate impact alone is sufficient to prove a
discriminatory classification. It has, however, expressed doubt that such
evidence is ever allowable.301 Nevertheless, two court of appeals decisions
have indicated that such evidence is not germane in an equal protection or
equal rights challenge.
In Bailey v. City of Austin,302 the court of appeals considered a state equal
protection and equal rights challenge to a referendum amendment of the Austin
city charter that eliminated employee benefits for “domestic partners.”
Although the amendment was facially gender neutral, the plaintiffs, who were
several city employees and their same-sex domestic partners, argued that the
amendment would have a disproportionate effect on homosexuals. They
argued such impact existed because “all homosexual employees with domestic
partners are deprived of benefits for their partners while only a portion of
heterosexual employees with domestic partners, those who choose not to
marry, are similarly deprived of benefits.”303 The court of appeals rejected this
argument.
“Evidence of a disproportionate burden alone,” the court stated, “is not
enough to warrant analysis under the alleged classification [homosexuals]
rather than the statutory classification . . . Evidence of an intent to classify on
the basis of the alleged class is also necessary.”304 The court found that there
was insufficient evidence from which it could conclude that “the underlying
298. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (Vernon 1998).
299. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 358.
300. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 3a.
301. See Richards v. LULAC, 868 S.W.2d 306, 313-14 (Tex. 1993); see also In re McLean,
725 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. 1987) (“Our . . . inquiry is whether equality was denied because of a
person’s membership in a protected class of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.”).
302. Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App. 1998).
303. Id. at 186.
304. Id.
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intent behind the passage of [the referendum] was to discriminate against the
narrow class of homosexuals as opposed to the broader class of all unmarried
partners.”305 Holding that the classification at issue consisted of “all unmarried
domestic partners,” the court determined that the referendum was rationally
related to a legitimate purpose, which was the city’s interest in recognizing
legal relationships, including marriages.306 Also, in Lawrence v. State,307 as
previously noted, the court of appeals rejected an equal rights challenge to the
state sodomy statute. The court stated that where a statute is gender-neutral on
its face, those who challenge it “bear the burden of showing [that] the statute
has had an adverse effect upon one gender and that such disproportionate
impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”308 Advocates of
homosexual marriage cannot show that laws restricting marriage to one man
and one woman adversely affect either men or women.
Article I, section 3, of the Texas Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
“All free men . . . have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to
exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of
public service.”309 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that “the
same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas
Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.”310 In State v.
Richards,311 the Texas Supreme Court stated that a “classification must be
based on a real and substantial difference having relation to the subject of the
particular enactment,”312 but added, “if there is a reasonable ground therefore
and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held
305. Id. at 187.
306. Id. at 187-90.
307. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc).
308. Id. at 359.
309. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3.
310. Reid v. Rolling Fork Public Utility Dist., 979 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990)) (stating that equal protection cases
decided under the Texas Constitution “echo federal standards when determining whether a statute
violates equal protection under either provision”); Goheen v. Koester, 794 S.W.2d 830, 834 n.3
(Tex. App. 1990) (noting that “[t]he equal protection clause of the United States Constitution has
been held to be co-extensive with article I, section 3 of the Texas Constitution”); Twiford v.
Nueces County Appraisal Dist., 725 S.W.2d 325, 328 n.5 (Tex. App. 1987) (noting that the “same
requirements” apply to equal protection challenges under the Texas and United States
Constitutions). See also Garay v. State, 940 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. App. 1997) (stating that
“[t]he Texas equal protection provision traditionally corresponds to the federal provision”);
Rodriguez v. Motor Express, Inc., 909 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App. 1995) (“Equal protection
challenges under the Texas and United States Constitutions are analyzed in the same manner.”),
rev’d on other grounds, Motor Express, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 925 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1996); Hogan v.
Hallman, 889 S.W.2d 332, 338 (Tex. App. 1994) (“Texas cases follow federal standards when
determining whether a statute violates equal protection under either provision.”).
311. State v. Richards, 301 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1957).
312. Id. at 600-01.
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valid.”313 As Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Phillips has noted,
“Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis
Given this
in interpreting our own equal protection provision.”314
interpretation, it is unlikely that the Texas Supreme Court would interpret the
state equal protection guarantee to require recognition of same-sex marriages
unless the Equal Protection Clause is so interpreted.
16. Utah
Article IV, section 1, of the Utah Constitution provides: “The rights of
citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this State shall
enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.”315 This
section, which was part of the original constitution of the State of Utah,
appears in an article of the state constitution dealing with elections and the
right of suffrage. Perhaps not surprisingly, the focus of the debates in the
constitutional convention was on female suffrage.316
Utah courts have not agreed on a standard of review for sex-based
classifications. An early decision of the Utah Supreme Court did apply the
rational-basis standard in interpreting article IV, section 1.317 A later decision
of the Utah Court of Appeals, however, observed that the Utah Supreme Court
had not yet determined the appropriate standard of review, and opined that the
state standard is “at least as stringent as the [federal] equal protection
intermediate review for gender discrimination.”318
Regardless of the applicable standard of review, however, the wording of
the second sentence of article IV, section 1, would not appear to support a right
to same-sex marriage.319 Men and women enjoy equal rights with respect to

313. Id. at 601.
314. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 703 (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting from
opinion striking down statute limiting personal injury damage awards under the “open courts”
guarantee of the Texas Constitution).
315. UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1. The language of this provision was taken from article 6,
section 1, of the Wyoming Constitution. See WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 1.
316. See 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS & DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTION
ASSEMBLED AT SALT LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, TO ADOPT A
CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 420-91, 496-601, 679-767 (State Printing Co. 1898).
317. See Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Utah 1974) (upholding statute establishing
different ages of majority for men and women).
318. Estate of Scheller v. Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (preventing fathers
from inheriting from illegitimate children, unless they have openly treated the children as their
own, does not violate either the state or federal constitution). See also Redwood Gym v. Salt
Lake County Comm’n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1147 (Utah 1981) (not deciding whether “a classification
based on sex . . . is or should be inherently suspect under Utah law”).
319. UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1 (stating that “[b]oth male and female citizens of this state shall
equally enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and privileges”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

952

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:909

the right of marriage. Both men and women may marry a member of the
opposite sex; neither may marry a member of the same sex. Inequality is not
found in the statute that prohibits same-sex marriages.320 This is confirmed by
the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County
Commission.321 In Redwood Gym, the supreme court rejected an equal
protection and sex discrimination challenge to a Salt Lake County ordinance
prohibiting opposite-sex massages by employees of commercial massage
parlors.322 Without specifically mentioning article IV, section 1, the court
stated:
Plaintiffs suggest that the ordinance provision creates a classification based on
sex, which is or should be inherently suspect under Utah law. Without ruling
upon the latter portion of this contention, we observe that no sex classification
is created. Not all legal provisions which take gender into consideration create
such sex-based classifications. The terms of the opposite-sex massage
provision do not place either sex at an inherent legal disadvantage vis-a-vis the
other. Men and women are afforded an equal right to practice as licensed
masseurs, or to patronize massage parlors. Only the massage of a member of
one sex by a member of the other sex is forbidden. It is true that the makeup
of the clientele may, as a practical matter, determine the gender of massage
parlor employees, and vice versa. Such distinctions, however, are not
creatures of law, and their existence does not offend equal protection.323

The court’s reasoning has obvious implications for the recognition of same-sex
marriages.
In a series of cases, two of which were later reversed by the Supreme Court
on federal constitutional grounds, the Utah Supreme Court displayed a
willingness to recognize biological differences between the sexes as a valid
basis for a difference in treatment.324 In Stanton v. Stanton,325 the Utah
Supreme Court held that a statute setting different ages of majority for men and
women did not violate either the state or federal constitution, noting that “girls
tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and mentally before boys,
and . . . generally tend to marry earlier.”326 In Turner v. Department of
Employment Security,327 the court held that a statute declaring a person
ineligible for unemployment compensation for twelve weeks before and six
weeks after the expected date of childbirth, and during any week of
unemployment when it was found that her total or partial unemployment was

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(5) (1998).
See Redwood Gym, 624 P.2d at 1147.
See id.
Id.
See discussion infra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1974).
Id. at 1012.
Turner v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 531 P.2d 870 (Utah 1975).
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due to pregnancy, did not violate article IV, section 1, of the Utah
Constitution.328 The court commented that “[i]t is just as bad to treat unequal
things as equals as it is to treat equal things unequally.”329 In Swayne v. L.D.S.
Social Services,330 the Utah Supreme Court upheld the validity of a statute that
required the consent of the mother to the adoption of an illegitimate child, but
not of the natural father unless, prior to the adoption, he had filed an
acknowledgment of paternity with the state health department. The court
rejected both state and federal constitutional challenges to the statute.331 With
respect to the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause claim, the court stated:
Utah’s registration statute was designed to facilitate permanent and secure
placement of illegitimate children whose unwed mothers wish to give them up
for adoption and whose unwed fathers take no steps to officially identify
themselves and acknowledge paternity. Because the identity of a mother of an
illegitimate child is usually readily ascertainable, an unwed mother is forced to
either immediately assume legal responsibility for the physical care of her
child or relinquish her parental rights. Paternity, however, is more difficult to
establish. Even a father who informally acknowledges his responsibility for a
pregnancy may later deny paternity and possibly avoid legal liability for his
child’s care. Thus, a reasonable basis for the different classification of unwed
fathers and unwed mothers in [the statute] is the fact that while identification
of both parents of an illegitimate child is necessary, identification of a child’s
mother is automatic because of her role in the birth process, while
identification of the father is not. A reasonable basis for the different
classification of filing and nonfiling fathers is the state’s need to distinguish
those fathers who have accepted legal responsibility for the care of their
children from those fathers who have not. Whether [the statute] utilizes the
best means for accomplishing this purpose involves policy issues which lie
within the prerogative of the legislature to address. Nevertheless, we are
sufficiently convinced that there are reasonable bases for the classifications in
[the statute] and that the classifications are reasonably calculated to serve a
proper governmental objective.332

With respect to the plaintiff’s argument under article IV, section 1, the
supreme court stated that even if it accepted the proposition that the Utah
Constitution defines gender as an “inherently suspect classification,” plaintiff’s
claim would fail.333 It further stated that because “‘the mere existence of a

328. Id. at 871 (basing its reasoning on the idea that “[i]n the matter of pregnancy there is no
way to find equality between men and women”).
329. Id.
330. Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990).
331. See id.
332. Id. at 641 (footnotes omitted).
333. See id.
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biological link’ by itself has not been deemed to create a fundamental right in
an unwed father to parent his illegitimate child.”334
In State v. Housekeeper,335 the Utah Supreme Court rejected a challenge to
the former statutory rape statute which applied only to males.336 The court
stated that the legislature’s decision to define the offense as one which could
be committed only by a male against a female was justified by the need to
address the problem of adolescent pregnancy.337 Moreover, the court justified
the statute by the fact that adult males are more sexually aggressive than adult
females and more likely to take advantage of immature girls than adult females
are likely to take advantage of immature boys.338
Utah has two provisions in its Declaration of Rights that have been treated
as equal protection guarantees. Article I, section 2, provides: “All political
power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on their
authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter
or reform their government as the public welfare may require.”339
Additionally, article I, section 24, provides that “[a]ll laws of a general nature
shall have uniform operation.”340 Both provisions have been determined to
provide the guarantee of equal protection to individuals.
The Utah Supreme Court held that, although article I, section 2, “uses the
language ‘equal protection,’ [and] . . . is relevant to the construction of Article
I, [section] 24, it is more a statement of a purpose of government than a legal
standard that can be used to measure the legality of governmental action.”341
Article I, section 24, is “generally considered the equivalent of the Equal
Protection Clause of the [Fourteenth] Amendment, [of the] U.S.
Constitution.”342 Accordingly, section 24 would not be interpreted to
recognize same-sex marriages unless the Equal Protection Clause were so
interpreted.

334. Id. (citation omitted). See also In re Adoption of B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967, 972 (Utah 1999)
(following Swayne).
335. State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978).
336. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401 (1999).
337. See Housekeeper, 588 P.2d at 141.
338. Id.
339. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 2.
340. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24.
341. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 n.13 (Utah 1984).
342. Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80, 81 n.1 (Utah 1982). See also Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989) (stating that “[t]he principles and concepts
embodied in the federal equal protection clause and [article I, section 24] are substantially
similar”); Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm’n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1146 (Utah 1981)
(refusing to apply a more rigid standard with respect to Utah’s equal protection provision).
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17. Virginia
Article I, section 11, of the Virginia Constitution provides that “the right to
be free from any governmental discrimination upon the basis of religious
conviction, race, color, sex, or national origin shall not be abridged, except that
the mere separation of the sexes shall not be considered discrimination.”343
The Virginia Supreme Court has consistently held that the anti-discrimination
clause of article I, section 11, is no broader than the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.344 Given this interpretation, Virginia’s prohibition
of same-sex marriages345 would not violate article I, section 11, unless it also
violated the federal Equal Protection Clause. It is unlikely, therefore, that the
Virginia Supreme Court would invalidate the public policy against same-sex
marriages on the authority of section 11. This conclusion is reinforced by the
court’s holdings that a mother or father in an openly homosexual relationship
is not a fit parent to have custody of minor children.346
18. Washington
Article XXXI, section 1, of the Washington Constitution provides:
“Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex.”347

343. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11. The legislative debates on article I, section 11, do not
particularly illuminate the reasons for the legislature’s inclusion of sex among the prohibited
grounds of discrimination (through an “oversight,” the category of sex had been left out of the
draft of section 11 proposed by the Constitutional Revision Commission), but they do reflect a
concern that discrimination against women in the past, as opposed to discrimination against
blacks, had not been adequately addressed by the federal Equal Protection Clause. See
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES PERTAINING TO
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION, Extra Session 1969, Regular Session 1970 at 482, 671
(Charles K. Woltz, ed.) (comments of Delegate McDiarmid); Id. at 534 (comments of Sen.
Howell noting that “[t]he University of Virginia has at last seen the light in preparing to admit
women to the first year classes” and stating that “the women of Virginia are entitled to full
participation in the educational process of this State”).
344. See Archer v. Mayes, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (Va. 1973) (rejecting challenge to “opt-out”
statutes allowing women, but not men, to be automatically excused from jury duty if they are
needed to take care of minor children or disabled persons); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem’l
Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Va. 1983) (abolishing common law doctrine of necessaries,
which benefited women, but not men). See also Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 785-86 (W.D.
Va. 1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and questions certified, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
345. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2000).
346. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (although “a lesbian mother is
not per se an unfit parent,” the “[c]onduct inherent in lesbianism is punishable as a . . . felony
[and] . . . that conduct is another important consideration in determining custody”); Roe v. Roe,
324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (“The father’s continuous exposure of the child to his immoral
and illicit [homosexual] relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of
law.”) (emphasis added).
347. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
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Washington, like Pennsylvania, applies an “absolutist” standard of review
to sex-based classifications in the law. If the classification is based on sex, it is
invalid, except in three narrow circumstances. In Darrin v. Gould,348 the
Washington Supreme Court held that the state equal rights amendment was
“intended to do more than repeat what was already contained in the otherwise
governing constitutional provisions, federal and state, by which discrimination
based on sex was permissible under the rational relationship and strict scrutiny
tests” and absolutely prohibits discrimination based on sex.349 The supreme
court, however, acknowledged that three possible exceptions to this blanket
rule would be “the regulation of cohabitation in sexual activity between
unmarried persons; protection of fundamental rights of privacy; and dissimilar
treatment on account of a characteristic unique to one’s sex.”350 The
Washington Supreme Court relied on the last exception to uphold a municipal
ordinance prohibiting women, but not men, from appearing topless in public.351
In City of Seattle v. Buchanan, the court stated that “there is a real difference
between the sexes with respect to breasts, which is reasonably related to the
preservation of public decorum and morals.”352 That difference, according to
the court, is that “the female breasts, . . . unlike the male breasts, constitute an
erogenous zone and are commonly associated with sexual arousal.”353 Because
the ordinance “applies alike to men and women, requiring both to cover those
parts of their bodies which are intimately associated with the procreation
function,” it “does not classify or discriminate on the basis of sex” and,
therefore, does not violate the state equal rights amendment.354
In Singer v. Hara,355 the Washington Court of Appeals considered an
appeal from a trial court order refusing to compel the county auditor to issue a
marriage license to two males. After interpreting the State’s marriage statutes

348. Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975) (en banc).
349. Id. at 889. In Darrin, the court struck down a high school athletic association rule
forbidding female high school students from playing on interscholastic football teams without
regard to their individual abilities. Id. at 883-84. See also Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Pierce
County, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash. 1983) (“The ERA absolutely prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex and is not subject to even the narrow exceptions permitted under traditional ‘strict
scrutiny.’”) (quoting Darrin, 540 P.2d at 886); In re Welfare of Hauser, 548 P.2d 333, 337
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that state equal rights amendment “is an absolute prohibition
against discrimination [b]ased on sex”) (citing Darrin, 540 P.2d at 882) (emphasis added).
350. Darrin, 540 P.2d at 890 n.8.
351. City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918, 920 (Wash. 1978).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 921.
355. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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not to allow same-sex marriages,356 the court turned to the plaintiffs’ state and
federal constitutional claims. The State argued that the prohibition of samesex marriages did not violate the state equal rights amendment because the
prohibition affects men and women equally, since neither may marry members
of the same sex.357 The plaintiffs countered that the State’s position could not
be reconciled with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v.
Virginia,358 striking down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statutes.359 The court
of appeals found Loving to be distinguishable because the laws struck down in
that case “were founded on an impermissible racial classification.”360 By way
of contrast, the relationship described by the term marriage has always been
understood as “the legal union of one man and one woman.”361 Unlike the
laws at issue in Loving,
[t]here is no analogous sexual classification involved in the instant case
because [plaintiffs] are not being denied entry into the marriage relationship
because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry into the marriage
relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one
which may be entered into only by two persons who are members of the
opposite sex.362

The plaintiffs’ claim of discrimination was not supported by the state equal
rights amendment, whose “primary purpose” was “to overcome discriminatory
legal treatment as between men and women ‘on account of sex.’”363 “To
accept the [plaintiffs’] contention that the ERA must be interpreted to prohibit
statutes which refuse to permit same-sex marriages,” the court cautioned,
“would be to subvert the purpose for which the ERA was enacted by
expanding its scope beyond that which was undoubtedly intended by the
majority of the citizens of this state who voted for the amendment.”364
Rejecting this interpretation, the court stated:
We are of the opinion that a commonsense reading of the language of the ERA
indicates that an individual is afforded no protection under the ERA unless he
or she first demonstrates that a right or responsibility has been denied solely
because of that individual’s sex. [Plaintiffs] are unable to make such a showing
because the right or responsibility they seek does not exist. The ERA does not

356. Id. at 1189 (construing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.04.010-26.04.250 (West 1997)).
More recently, the prohibition of same-sex “marriage” has been made explicit. See WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.04.020(1)(c) (West 1997 & Supp. 2002).
357. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1190-91.
358. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
359. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1192.
363. Id. at 1194 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1).
364. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1194.
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create any new rights or responsibilities, such as the conceivable right of
persons of the same sex to marry one another; rather, it merely insures that
existing rights and responsibilities, or such rights and responsibilities as may
be created in the future, which previously might have been wholly or partially
denied to one sex or to the other, will be equally available to members of either
sex.365

The prohibition of same-sex marriages does not deny either men or women
a right available to members of the opposite sex, but a right to “marry”
someone of the same sex.366 The court explained:
[I]t is apparent that the state’s refusal to grant a license allowing the [plaintiffs]
to marry one another is not based upon [their] status as males, but rather it is
based upon the state’s recognition that our society as a whole views marriage
as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of
children. This is true even though married couples are not required to become
parents and even though some couples are incapable of becoming parents and
even though not all couples who produce children are married. These,
however, are exceptional situations. The fact remains that marriage exists as a
protected legal institution primarily because of societal values associated with
the propagation of the human race. Further, it is apparent that no same-sex
couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union. Thus the
refusal of the state to authorize same-sex marriages results from such
impossibility of reproduction rather than from an invidious discrimination “on
account of sex.” Therefore, the definition of marriage as the legal union of one
man and one woman is permissible as applied to [plaintiffs], notwithstanding
the prohibition contained in the ERA, because it is founded upon the unique
physical characteristics of the sexes and [plaintiffs] are not being discriminated
against because of their status as males per se. In short, we hold that the ERA
does not require the state to authorize same-sex marriage.367

The court of appeals also rejected the plaintiffs’ federal equal protection
claim, finding that plaintiffs had not made out a case of sexual
discrimination.368 “[Plaintiffs] were not denied a marriage license because of
their sex; rather, they were denied a marriage license because of the nature of
marriage itself.”369 The court found no greater merit in the plaintiffs’
alternative federal claim. In responding to the argument that the marriage laws
discriminate against them as homosexuals, the court agreed with the State that
“to define marriage to exclude homosexual or any other same-sex relationships
is not to create an inherently suspect legislative classification requiring strict

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1195-97.
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1196.
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judicial scrutiny to determine a compelling state interest.”370 The reservation
of marriage to opposite sex couples easily satisfied the rational-basis standard
of judicial review:
Although . . . married persons are not required to have children . . . marriage is
so clearly related to . . . the growth of children that we are unable to say that
there is not a rational basis upon which the state may limit the protection of its
marriage laws to the legal union of one man and one woman.”371

Accordingly, the court concluded, “although the legislature may change the
definition of marriage within constitutional limits, the constitution does not
require the change sought by appellants.”372
Singer v. Hara is consistent with a number of Washington state court
decisions explaining the purpose and effect of the state equal rights
amendment. For example, in Marchioro v. Neal,373 the Washington Supreme
Court said that “[t]he thrust of the equal rights amendment [was] to end special
treatment for or discrimination against either sex.”374 The amendment, the
court stressed, does not permit “exclusionary statutes which apply to one sex
only.”375 The prohibition of same-sex marriages, of course, applies to both
sexes. In City of Seattle v. Buchanan,376 the court said that the equal rights
amendment was “designed to protect the substantial rights of women.”377
Those rights are not affected by the State’s prohibition of same-sex marriages.
Finally, in Irwin v. Coluccio,378 the Washington Court of Appeals referred to
the “right of every woman to be treated as an equal member of society” under
the state equal rights amendment.379 That right is not threatened by a ban on
same-sex marriages.
19. Wyoming
Article 6, section 1, of the Wyoming Constitution provides: “The rights of
citizens of the State of Wyoming to vote and hold office shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this state shall
equally enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.”380

370. Id.
371. Id. at 1197.
372. Id.
373. Marchioro v. Neale, 582 P.2d 487 (Wash. 1978), aff’d, 442 U.S. 191 (1979).
374. Marchioro, 582 P.2d at 491.
375. Id. at 492.
376. City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1978).
377. Id. at 921.
378. Irwin v. Coluccio, 648 P.2d 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
379. Id. at 460 (abolishing actions for criminal conversation).
380. WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 1. Article 1, section 2, contains a more general statement of
equality: “In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the
human race are equal.” WYO. CONST, art. 1, § 2. Finally, article 1, section 3, guarantees equality
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In Ward Terry & Company v. Hensen,381 the Wyoming Supreme Court
stated that the “[c]ivil rights mentioned [in article 6, section 1] include the
rights of property, marriage, protection by the laws, freedom of contracts, trials
by jury.”382 Does the civil right of marriage secured by article 6, section 1,
extend to same-sex marriage?383 The phrasing of the second sentence of
section 1 would seem to indicate that it does not. Section 1 provides, in part,
that “[b]oth male and female citizens of this state shall equally enjoy all civil,
political and religious rights and privileges.”384 Men and women enjoy equal
rights with respect to the civil right of marriage. Both may marry a member of
the opposite sex and neither may marry a member of the same sex.385 Thus,
there is no inequality in the marriage law.
In State v. Yazzie,386 the court affirmed that inequality does not exist in
marriage laws. In Yazzie, the court upheld a statute providing that both men
and women, similarly qualified, are competent to serve on juries. Referring to
the “equality” provisions of the state constitution, including article 1, section 3,
and article 6, section 1, the court emphasized that “women in Wyoming are
men’s equals before the law.”387 Nothing in the prohibition of same-sex
marriages contravenes this principle.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has acknowledged the various equal
protection standards employed by the United States Supreme Court, but has
not determined which standard applies to sex-based classifications under
article 1, sections 2 and 3, and article 6, section 1, of the Wyoming
Constitution.388 Nevertheless, the court has recognized that a legislative
classification based on a physical characteristic unique to one sex does not
violate article 6, section 1. In A v. X, Y & Z,389 the Wyoming Supreme Court
held that the natural father of a child born to a woman married to another man

of “political rights and privileges.” WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 3. Because the right to marry is a
civil, not a political right, see Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 297 P.2d 213, 215 (Wyo. 1956),
article 1, section 3, would not appear to have any bearing on the issue of same-sex marriages.
There was virtually no debate on either article 1, section 2, or article 1, section 3, at the Wyoming
Constitutional Convention. See JOURNAL AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF WYOMING 718-21, 723-29, 847-48 (Daily Sun, Book & Job Printing 1893)
[hereinafter JOURNAL AND DEBATES].
381. Ward Terry & Co., 297 P.2d at 213.
382. Id. at 215.
383. The debates surrounding the adoption of article 6, section 1, which focused on female
suffrage, sheds no light on this question. See JOURNAL AND DEBATES, supra note 380, at 344-59.
384. WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 1.
385. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (Michie 2001).
386. State v. Yazzie, 218 P.2d 482 (Wyo. 1950).
387. Id. at 483.
388. See Johnson v. State Hearing Exam’rs Office, 838 P.2d 158, 164-67 (Wyo. 1992)
(discussing various standards).
389. A v. X, Y & Z, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1982).
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did not have either a statutory or a constitutional right to bring an action to
determine paternity, even though the mother had a statutory right to bring such
an action against the natural father. In its opinion, the court explained why
there is an obvious biological justification for requiring greater evidence of
paternity than of maternity:
The classification here made is not “entirely unrelated to any differences
between men and women.” The differences are the very foundation of the
classification. Here, they are obvious. The woman carries the child through
pregnancy. When born of her, the fact of motherhood is obvious. Not so the
man. The proof of fatherhood, or the proof of the lack thereof, must come
from an external source. The entire classification within the . . . act is
premised on this basic and obvious distinction, it is not invidious, but
“realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated” in the
circumstances. Men do not bear children and give birth to them.
Furthermore, to word the enactment without gender classification would
result as a purpose for the enactment to be a determination of the existence or
nonexistence of a presumed mother in addition to that of a presumed father.
Such result would be an absurdity. Nature identifies the mother at the time of
birth. There is no need to engage in presumptions.390

With respect to the general equal protection guarantee of the Wyoming
Constitution,391 the Wyoming Supreme Court held that “the Wyoming
Constitution offers more robust protection against legal discrimination than the
federal constitution.”392 In the absence of a “suspect class” or a “fundamental
right,” however, the court applies the rational relationship test.393 There is no
basis in Wyoming constitutional law for treating homosexuals as a “suspect
class” or the right of one homosexual to “marry” another as a fundamental
right.
III. CONCLUSION
Nothing in the text, history or interpretation of state equal rights provisions
even remotely suggests that those provisions should invalidate state policies
against same-sex marriages. The unmistakable purpose of these provisions
was to eradicate discrimination in the law in favor of men and against women,
as well as discrimination in favor of women and against men. Under state
equal rights provisions, the law may not benefit or burden men or women in a
manner not applicable to members of the opposite sex. Clearly, laws

390. Id. at 1225. The supreme court’s recognition of this exception to the scope of article 6,
section 1, may have significance with respect to the issue of same-sex marriages. See discussion
supra notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
391. See WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
392. Allhusen v. State, 898 P.2d 878, 884 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted).
393. Id. at 885.
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prohibiting same-sex marriages do not benefit or burden either sex to the
advantage or disadvantage of the other. Moreover, such laws are gender
neutral and do not have a discriminatory impact on either men or women.
The notion that state equal rights provisions would affect the State’s ability
to define marriage as a legal relationship between one man and one woman
finds no support in the circumstances surrounding the adoption of these
provisions. Such a suggestion would come as a surprise to the constitutional
convention delegates and legislators who proposed them and the voters who
approved them. No state court of final jurisdiction has held that a prohibition
of same-sex marriages violates a state equal rights provision. Moreover, no
state court has held that homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class under
such provision. In sum, there is no principled basis on which a state court
could interpret a state equal rights provision to require recognition of same-sex
marriage in violation of the public policy of the state. The choice to recognize
such relationships rests with the legislatures of the states, not their courts.

